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Abstract
During the last two decades, signiﬁcant efforts towards the deregulation of the electricity
industry have been observed worldwide, involving the unbundling of vertically integrated
monopoly utilities, the introduction of competition in the generation and supply sectors,
and the open access to the electricity network. In contrast with traditionally regulated
paradigm, deregulation calls for more involving participants for bringing more competition.
In order to facilitate the participation of large number of players, a novel market structure,
where individual player seeking for its own interest, is proposed by a project called ‘Au-
tonomic Power System’; according to which, the new structure will accommodate both
the operation(short-term) and investment(long-term) need for the future complex electricity
market in decentralised pattern.
Speciﬁcally, players are encouraged to enter the market and participate in the sectors they
are interested in. Players can be existing and new generating units, demand suppliers that
represent aggregated customers and even merchant companies who are neither generating
units nor demand suppliers. The sectors they could participate include power scheduling,
generation investment and transmission network investment etc.. Game theory and Agent-
based modelling are both good tools to model the behaviours of numerous players and their
mutual effect with each other. A central entity will be present for reconciling conﬂicting
objectives if necessary.
In this thesis, due to the incompetence in allocating investment cost among system users
given traditional centralised planning paradigm, we mainly focus on proposing methods for
decentralised investing in the network; under which circumstance, transmission planning will
rely on market forces and proﬁt-driven decisions of self-interested players. This paradigm
will gain continuous grounds as it accounts for the interests of the different market agents and
is deemed as a further step towards the liberalisation and efﬁcient operation of the electricity
industry. An iterative method is employed to search for Nash equilibrium of the game and a
heuristic approach is adopted for deriving a coordinated solution when no or multiple NE
are reached. Case studies will demonstrate the individual investment intentions for different
situations and the physical/economic signiﬁcance of the obtained solutions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis will concentrate on proposing methods for solving transmission investment
problem in decentralised manner. To address the above objective, game theory, primarily
non-cooperative game theory is adopted to model decentralised decision making among
independent participants. We could also apply Agent-based modelling(ABM) and learning
algorithm to simulate the behaviours of enormous autonomous agents in the electricity market
and investigate self-actions and interactions among them for evaluating the inﬂuences to
the whole system [41]. The ultimate aim is to get different autonomous agents operate in
a coordinated way and arbitrate among individual conﬂicting objectives within a localised
paradigm.
1.1 Motivation
During the last two decades, deregulation of the electricity industry has been observed world-
wide, involving the unbundling of vertically integrated monopoly utilities, the introduction
of competition in the generation and supply sectors, and the open access to the electricity net-
works. In contrast with traditionally regulated paradigm, deregulated environment will spur
more participants involved, which accordingly bring increasing uncertainty and complexity
to the electricity market. Therefore, new structure for electricity market must be designed
to furnish enough ﬂexibility and controllability. A proposal ”Autonomic Power System”,
basing on an assumption of the 2050’s energy system’s characteristics and interconnectivity,
is addressed to meet new market need. This interdisciplinary project, relying on distributed
intelligence and decentralised goal setting, is different with the current smart grid vision
since the latter can be achieved provided that retroﬁtted within the existing infrastructure.
While the autonomic power system (APS for short) will have a completely transformation
in infrastructure, operational rules, market structure, and design guidelines of the existing
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system. It will possess the ability of self-conﬁguring, self-healing, self-optimising and
self-protecting [53].
Speciﬁcally, since the system that APS aims for establish is the one in 2050, it needs new
framework and methodologies both in operational(short-term) and investment (long-term)
decision makings. In operational aspect, complex inter-temporal constraints for generation
side including minimum-up/minimum-down time, start-up cost etc. could be considered to
allow generators to decide their own unit commitment scheduling. While for the demand
side, elastic or even strategic behaviours for those loads that being able to vary or shift their
consumptions along with the real time electricity prices are also worth taken into account.
Nevertheless, generators/demand suppliers have already been participating and making some
decisions themselves in operational perspective and further works that can be done are
therefore very limited.
As for investment, plans of expanding on existing generation capacities or building new
generating units are instinctively decided by individual generating companies based on their
own interests. Hence the generation investment is conforming to decentralised mechanism.
As for transmission network planning, there are two general approaches adopted [28, 31, 52,
57]. Under the ﬁrst approach, planning is centrally carried out by a regulated transmission
company, which realises under regulatory supervision the optimal transmission expansion
plan that maximises the social welfare while satisfying security of supply requirements. The
required capital cost plus a suitable rate of return for the transmission company is recovered
from the network users. In this context, research efforts have focused on the solution of the
centralised optimal transmission planning problem [2, 9, 12, 15, 33], as well as the allocation
of transmission costs among the users [8, 10, 13, 30, 48, 56].
Under the second approach, transmission planning relies on market forces and decen-
tralised, proﬁt-driven proposals of self-interested players. These players may generally
include merchant transmission companies as well as generation and demand users of the
network. This paradigm is gaining continuously grounds as it accounts for the interests of
the different market agents and is deemed as a further step towards the liberalisation and
efﬁcient operation of the electricity industry [20].
To sum up, this thesis will focus on developing approaches to facilitate the transmission
investment among system users in decentralised way. The advantages of expanding the
transmission network in decentralised manner are not only to meet deregulation requirement,
it could also thoroughly resolve the cost allocation conundrum that arose when centrally
decide the transmission expansion. Speciﬁcally, system users will consider the portion of
investment cost they have to pay, based on which, they procure the best capacity to build for
obtaining the maximum proﬁt. Therefore this decentralised paradigm will entitle investment
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cost to be accounted for undoubtedly and more importantly each system user will be happy
with its share on the investment cost.
1.2 Why not centralised solving transmission planning?
It should be known that additional transmission capacity is decided centrally at present. The
corresponding investment cost then has to be allocated to different system users based on
some sensible principles. In this section, we will brieﬂy review several papers regarding
current cost allocation methods, among which, the dominant suggestion is to make system
participants pay the portion according to how much they use the network. Extensive works [8,
10, 13, 30, 48, 56] have been done by scholars in this respect, which were originally driven
to decide the allocation of transmission cost due to the deregulation and unbundling of
transmission services.
In [8], the author applies proportional sharing principle, which assumes that each node
is a perfect mixer of incoming ﬂows so that share of each generator in an outﬂow power
from a bus is equal to its share in inﬂow power into that bus, to assess the contribution each
individual generator/demand to each individual power ﬂow. Due to inability to ‘dye the
incoming ﬂows and check the colour of the outﬂows, this principle can be neither proved
nor disproved. In this respect, the principle is fair according to the author as it treats all
the incoming and out-ﬂowing ﬂows in the same way’. Similarly, [30] and [56] also adopt
proportional sharing principle such that contribution of each generator in an outﬂow is equal
to its share in the inﬂow. While distribution factors are used in [13] and [48] to quantify the
use of transmission lines by users so as to recognise their corresponding allocations. The
method in [13] has also been compared with those from [8], [30] and [56], from which we
observe that these methods give different allocations especially for large system. But the
authors believe that they are all providing reasonable results since through approximations,
they could chase the power ﬂows from generators to consumers, which thereby allowing
to identify the parties that responsible for the ﬂows. Work in [10] has similar formulation
with [13] and [48] as his method is likewise based on sensitivity factors but with AC power
ﬂows.
In conclusion, aforementioned papers were focusing on ﬁnding which generator serves
which load and howmuch each user uses each line; thus people could allocate the transmission
investment cost to users by their identiﬁed contribution in line ﬂows. According to [44], this
is the ‘engineering way of thinking’ that those who ‘use’ the transmission facilities should
pay for them. But the book also pointed out that ‘computing the electrical utilisation of lines
by agents is not a simple task, since there is no indisputable method to do it’. This conclusion
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is drawn because there is no assessment to demonstrate the validity of the key principles that
support each of the above methods. After all, quantifying the real usage caused by each of
the users on a nonlinear transmission system was extremely hard. And applying methods
that may lack of theoretical validity to allocate the investment cost would thereby supply
inaccurate economic signals. As a result, another prevailing idea regarding transmission
investment cost allocation have come up in recent years, which suggested to evaluate each
user’s incremental beneﬁt received from additional transmission capacities [44]. In contrast
with assessing each system user’s usage on the transmission network, this beneﬁciaries-pay
criterion is regarded as economically fair and moreover providing consistent incentives for
investment.
In order to assess individual incremental beneﬁt due to the new expansion planning in
the network, optimal transmission investment capacities could be obtained via centralised
manner, which is to minimise the sum of the operating cost of serving demand(assuming
load is inelastic) plus the investment cost. Each system user then calculates its own beneﬁt
before/after carrying out this centralised capacity. Those that get reduced beneﬁt after
implementing new capacity would be exempted from paying the investment cost, while for
the beneﬁciaries, they will be distributed the investment cost based on their corresponding
incremental beneﬁts. Furthermore, some papers solve the transmission investment capacity in
a way that each participant submits the proposal on the transmission network by maximising
its own interest. This decentralised mechanism complies with beneﬁciaries-pay principle
essentially as participants will only propose to invest in the network if they can get beneﬁt
and the more the beneﬁt they could receive, the more their procured capacities will be.
There are a couple of papers in the literature that deals with transmission investment
problem in decentralised pattern, which will be enumerated hereinafter. In [52], by assuming
1. power ﬂow equals to capacity of the transmission line
2. no upper/lower bounds for power outputs and for investment capacities
it analytically derive the optimal transmission capacity under decentralised paradigm. The
obtained results indicate that decentralised expansion planning by merchant entities leads to
under-investment situation comparing to the centralised approach and the extent of this under-
investment is reduced with the increasing number of merchant entities involved. However,
when the number of merchants increased in decentralised planning, the authors assume that
each of them makes investment decisions sequentially, accounting for past but not possible
future investments by other entities. In other words, the approach did not take into account
the realistic interactions between decisions made by multiple self-interested participants.
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Consequently, in order to capture the strategic interactions and reconcile the conﬂicting
interests of autonomous players, a non-cooperative game theoretic framework is required
according to [36]. And such a framework is observed in [26], which adopts some assumptions
as:
1. The candidate lines that can be invested are pre-assigned;
2. The expansion capacity of the candidate lines are pre-deﬁned. Therefore players can
only choose investing with this value or not investing at all;
3. The potential investors are some of the generators, who are also pre-determined.
In this work, every player will be assigned a discrete set, from which it chooses its
strategy given what others’ choices. Then centralised economic dispatch is proceeded(the
only optimisation performed in this paper) and the corresponding production proﬁt for the
chosen strategy is calculated and recorded until spotting the one that offers the maximum
proﬁt. An exhaustive searching approach is employed for reaching pure-strategy Nash
Equilibrium for the transmission expansion game. However, the approach taken in this paper
has serious limitations. First of all, congestion revenue is not included inside the chosen
investors’ objective function. Moreover, each player’s best transmission capacity is not
obtained by maximising individual proﬁt, but by ergodic search. The latter consequently
yields a massive computational burden unless an unrealistically small number of players
and investment actions are considered. Although the paper also introduces mixed-strategy
equilibrium, it is not applicable in our point of view since in real transmission network,
people do not accept the situation such as player 1 has 23% possibility to invest on line 1 if
player 2 invests on the same line with 45% possibility.
1.3 Contributions
Due to the disadvantages of the central way for the transmission investment in terms of
allocating investment cost, and also due to the requirement of deregulation, we put forward a
number of methods in this thesis to solve the decentralised transmission planning problem.
Generally speaking, the introduced methods regarding decentralised transmission planning
are progressively evolutionary and advanced. This is attributed to the status quo that not too
many works have been done in this topic, which on one hand creates huge difﬁculties when
proposing new methods because we are unable to learn much from the previous works, but
on the other hand implicitly provide great freedom and spaces for the methods that to be
developed.
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The ﬁrst contribution of the proposed methods is that most of them abandon every assump-
tion that previous papers in the literature applied. For example, because of aforementioned
simpliﬁcations and assumptions used, the authors in [52] could obtain the linear relation
between the investment capacity and marginal value of transmission line, which is the key
for this paper’s modelling. However, these assumptions hold under very restricted situations.
In this thesis, on the contrary, we remove these assumptions and make the problem much
more general. Speciﬁcally, generation outputs and individual investment capacities will be all
restrained by bounds and power ﬂows are not equal to capacities of the transmission lines. As
for [26], the authors also apply several assumptions, such as deterministic investors, candidate
lines and invested capacities. These assumptions will simplify the problem to a great extent.
With regard to our methods, potential investors and candidate lines will not be pre-deﬁned.
If generators are players, each single one of them will be allowed to invest on each of the
lines in the transmission network with the capacity chosen by itself for the maximum proﬁt.
Similarly, apart from generators, demand suppliers or even merchant entities can also be
participating in the transmission investment to pursue for their own interests.
Secondly, for all the proposed methods, merchandising surplus resulted from price
differences between buses caused by congestion is designed to be collected by investors
based on their proposed capacities. In doing so, the investment behaviours in transmission
network will be encouraged. Likewise, they pay the proportionate investment cost according
to their own proposals. Because autonomous investors who could take part in transmission
investment in our new methods can be generators, demand suppliers or merchant companies,
the objectives of different players will accordingly be various. But regardless of the kind
of players, they will add investment proﬁt into their objective functions and consider the
entire earnings as a whole for deciding the best amount to invest respectively. As for the two
previous papers in the literature, the proﬁt function in [26] does not comprise the congestion
revenue as we did; while for [52], the applied assumptions entitle the authors to obtain the
linear relation between marginal value of transmission line and investment capacity, which
is then used to express the congestion surplus. Nevertheless, as our devotion to get rid of
the assumptions, a more accurate way is presented in our methods to model the authentic
congestion surplus.
The next contribution is that LMPs are precisely addressed for the two methods introduced
in Chapter 4 that have not been done in previous papers regarding transmission investment.
As is known, LMPs cannot be correctly formulated unless via centralised market clearing.
As a result, we derive the KKTs from market clearing process and use the Lagrangian
multipliers with respect to power balance and ﬂow constraints for formulating the real LMPs.
These KKTs are subsequently included under each player’s optimisation problem. As a
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consequence, when making individual investment decisions, each player could capture the
mutual and simultaneous effect between LMPs and total capacities of the transmission lines.
Therefore, these two methods are considered as the most advanced ones for decentralised
transmission expansion problem among all the proposed methods.
Furthermore, apart from variable investment cost, the proposed decentralised methods
could also take ﬁx investment cost, such as expenditure in infrastructure, land etc. into
account. Under this circumstance, players will decide the capacity for their best interests
when considering their share on both variable and ﬁx investment cost, which makes the ﬁx
cost fully accounted for.
In view of the situation that each independent player makes investment decisions itself,
the ﬁnal capacity for the transmission lines will be the sum of all these individual decisions.
Thus expecting result is that players reach an agreement on their respective investment
capacities. In other words, Nash equilibrium is expected among personal proposals. But
based on the fact that pure strategy Nash does not always exist [17], we prove the existence of
Nash equilibrium for some of the proposing methods in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 in relatively
small systems. The Nash equilibrium proof makes fairly sense because it would save people
lots of time from searching in a system that does not have any Nash. Case studies presented
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 showcase different Nash equilibrium obtained from different
proposing methods. And according to large number of case studies, we also classify players
with different rankings of motivation for investment. For example, the cheap generator and
the demand supplier locating in the area with expensive generator will have more interest in
investing in contrast with other participants. Moreover, it is demonstrated that decentralised
results will approach and eventually equal to centralised planning capacity with the increasing
number of identical participating players. This conclusion is critical to justify the social
efﬁciency of the performances under decentralised paradigm.
Finally, we ﬁgure out the conditions that makes transmission capacities under centralised
and decentralised paradigms equal. Those who concern about the feasibility of the decen-
tralised manner, as a result, could alternatively apply centralised manner to solve transmission
investment capacity, but allocate the cost based on decentralised solutions. In doing so, the
transmission system will be expanded with the most social efﬁcient plan, while in the
meantime each of the user is happy to pay the portion of cost assigned.
1.4 Related Publications
Works and results presented in Chapter 4 and 5 are partly based on the contents of the
following publications:
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• Y. Fan, D. Papadaskalopoulos and G. Strbac, “An MPEC Approach for Modeling
Decentralized Transmission Planning,” 2016 IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
under review.
• Y. Fan, D. Papadaskalopoulos and G. Strbac, “A Game Theoretic Modeling Framework
for Decentralized Transmission Planning," in 19th PSCC Conference, accepted.
1.5 Thesis Layout
This thesis is laid out as follows: detailed mathematical formulation for papers in the
literature regarding decentralised transmission investment, as well as relevant deﬁnitions and
algorithms are discussed in Chapter 2.
Several methods for decentralised transmission expansion game are put forward and
discussed in Chapter 3 associating with their respective advantages and disadvantages. A
2-bus and a 3-bus mesh system are both employed for modelling these new methods. We
analyse the decentralised capacities obtained from different methods, and compare them
with centralised expansion planning capacities in order for evaluating the performance of
proposing decentralised methods in social efﬁciency.
Chapter 4 introduces two more methods with respect to decentralised transmission
investment to get rid of the drawbacks in aforementioned methods in Chapter 3. Moreover
existence of Nash equilibrium for some of the methods in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is proved
using small systems.
Large number of sensitivity analysis for methods in Chapter 4 are presented in Chapter 5.
First of all, a 2-bus system is applied to assess how decentralised capacities would change
with different generation cost coefﬁcients, linear investment cost, and different number of
identical participants. Method proposed in Section 4.1 is also implemented in a 16-bus UK
system in Chapter 5. Cases with/without ﬁx investment cost involved and whether there is
original transmission lines existed are likewise considered.
In Chapter 6, we ﬁrstly ﬁgure out the circumstances that make solutions under centralised
and decentralised manners equal. Given which, expansion capacity in transmission system
could be decided by system operator, but the cost is allocated based on decentralised re-
sults. Moreover, the allocations obtained from beneﬁciaries-pay method with proposing
decentralised method are also compared in this chapter.
Finally, the thesis is concluded by reviewing all the proposing methods in decentralised
transmission investment along with respective merits in Chapter 7. Possible work extensions
are addressed at the end of this chapter.
Chapter 2
Literature Reviews
As discussed before, game theory and learning algorithm will be applied to model the
behaviours of increasing number of participants. Hence, we will introduce below all the
terms that related to the game theory and reinforcement learning. Moreover, several papers
are brieﬂy discussed in Chapter 1 regarding decentralised transmission investment. The
detailed mathematical formulation of these papers will also be reviewed in this chapter to
roughly acquaint with previous works.
2.1 Game theory and reinforcement learning
Some terminologies with respect to game theory have been mentioned in [26], because
the paper applies a non-cooperative game theoretic framework. This type of framework is
believed to be the one that we seek for dealing with decentralised transmission investment
problem. Therefore we will systematically introduce game theory as well as several relevant
terms and algorithms in this section for better understanding the methods we will propose
afterwards.
2.1.1 Nash equilibrium
As mentioned in Section 1.1, game theory will be employed to address the challenge of
facilitating participants making transmission investment decisions through decentralised
framework. Due to the capability of providing fundamental insights in decision making,
large number of applications related to game theory are proliﬁcally developed in all branches
of social sciences, especially in economics. While from economic point of view, game
theory is deﬁned as the study of mathematical models of conﬂict and cooperation between
intelligent rational decision makers. In the language of game theory, a game refers to any
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social situation that involves two or more individuals. Hence, the corresponding theory shall
offer the general mathematical techniques for analysing the situation in which individuals
make decisions that will inﬂuence one another’s welfare [39].
In a game, the individual involved is called players or decision makers, or simply persons.
There are two basic assumptions for people constructing players in their own games: they are
rational and they are intelligent. For rational characteristic, the players will make decisions
persistently seeking for his own interest. While players will be regarded as intelligent if they
know everything that we know about the game [39].
Each player will have respective decision rules(or in game theory, the more universal
term used is strategies), for determining its move. However, players do not always have
a complete control over the outcome due to the existence of uncertainties. Hence what
will actually be done would also depend on some information that not known yet and not
controlled by the players. Consequently, after the unknown quantities are realised, an action
is any consequence the player incurs according to his strategy. In a sense, a constant strategy
therefore coincides with the notion of action [6].
In view of variety of games applied in economics, a game in which the players act only
once and independently of each other is called a static game. While those that players act
more than once and time plays a role are therefore being considered as dynamic games [6].
But it is noted that there is no generally accepted criterion to differentiate static and dynamic
games. As a result, we shall call a game dynamic in this thesis if at least one player is allowed
to use a strategy that depends on previous actions since under this circumstance the decision
process for the player will evolve along with time. In addition, the non-cooperative game
theory [17] signiﬁes the situations that players’ decisions are only based on their own beneﬁts,
in contrast to the theory of cooperative games as the latter develops axioms meant to capture
the idea of fairness. For the games we intend to create for the decentralised transmission
investment, each player involved should pursue his own interest that will be partly conﬂicting
with others; moreover, players’ decisions will rely on previous actions. As a consequence,
we will concentrate upon dynamic non-cooperative games in this thesis.
Two different forms are applied generally to represent a game, which are extensive
form and strategic(normal) form. The latter and its generalisation are conceptually simpler
forms that are accordingly more convenient for general analysis purposes comparing to the
former [39]. In details, a game in normal form has three elements [11]:
1. The set of players Ψ, where Ψ= {1,2, . . . , i, . . . ,N};
2. The set of pure strategies Si (or equivalently feasible set) for player i;
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3. The payoff function fi (or objective function) that assigns a real number to each element
of the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces.
All players other than player i can be referred to as player i’s opponents and are therefore
denoted by i−. Players take actions from their respective strategy sets, i.e. si ∈ Si, thus all
players’ actions form a collective vector s= {s1, . . . ,sN}.
Assuming each player tries to minimise its objective function, the ith player’s decision
making problem is as:
minsi fi(si,si−)
s.t. si ∈ Si
(2.1)
It can be seen from (2.1) that the objective of a player depends upon his own actions and on the
actions of all other participants in the game. Players’ actions are accordingly interdependent.
Hence for obtaining the optimal actions for each player in the game, we will hold the actions
of his opponents ﬁxed. To do so, the action selection for all players but i is denoted as
si− ∈ Si− . And the collective actions for all players will be as:
(s1, . . . ,si−1,si′,si+1, . . . ,sN)
The equilibrium obtained from solving each player’s objective function (2.1) is known as
Nash equilibrium, which is a proﬁle of strategies such that each player’s strategy is an optimal
response to the other players’ strategies. Mathematically, pure strategy Nash equilibrium is
deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2.1. [17] A strategy proﬁle s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for all players i ∈Ψ
fi(s∗i ,s
∗
i−)≤ fi(si,s∗i−) ∀ si ∈ Si (2.2)
In other words, given the strategies of other players, if no player can beneﬁt by changing
his strategy unilaterally, the current set of actions constitute Nash equilibrium.
But it is worth noting that not all games have pure strategy Nash equilibrium [17]. For
those having Nash equilibrium, they may have one or more Nash equilibriums. However even
if a unique Nash equilibrium exists in a game, there is no guarantee that it will eventually
converge to this equilibrium. Similarly, if a game has multiple equilibriums, it may not
converge to any of them or even it converges, people will not know which equilibrium is
reached. These are the material facts that people have to be aware of for the Nash equilibrium
in game theory. After all, making self-interested players reaching an agreement based on
their conﬂicting beneﬁts is essentially a tough assignment.
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Nevertheless, there is another type of equilibrium called mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,
in contrast to pure strategy Nash equilibrium discussed above. Mixed strategy σi is a
probability distribution over pure strategies and σi(si) represents the probability that σi
assigns to pure strategy si. Player i’s payoff to σ is:
fi(σ) =∑
s
(
N
∏
i=1
σi(si)) fi(s)
Then the mathematical deﬁnition for mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is as:
Deﬁnition 2.2. [17] A mixed-strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for all players
i ∈Ψ
fi(σ∗i ,σ
∗
i−)≤ fi(si,σ∗i−) ∀ si ∈ Si (2.3)
The advantage of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium according to [17] is that every ﬁnite
strategic-form game deﬁnitely has a mixed-strategy equilibrium, where ﬁnite games imply the
set of players and all the strategy sets are not inﬁnite. Hence, the existence of equilibrium is
guaranteed. However, we prefer deterministic results much more than probabilistic outcomes
since the investment decisions must be concrete in the real transmission investment planning.
As a result, the goal of independent players in this thesis is in pursuit of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. And for all the emerging terms of Nash equilibrium in what follows, we refer to
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
2.1.2 Generalised Nash equilibrium problem
From the description above, each player chooses its action from the unchanged feasible set
Si, regardless of others’ decisions. It is sometimes not realistic for the electricity market since
players in this market may share some common resources or limitations. As a result, each
player’s feasible set is likely to depend on other players’ control actions [14]:
Si = Si(si−) (2.4)
Varying feasible set Si = Si(si−) can be denoted by
Si(si−) = {si ∈ Ri : gi(si,si−)≤ 0} (2.5)
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The problem with coupled constraints, can therefore be formulated as generalised Nash
equilibrium problems:
minsi fi(si,si−)
s.t. gi(si,si−)≤ 0
(2.6)
Similar to (2.2), a strategy proﬁle s∗ is a generalised Nash equilibrium if, for all players i ∈Ψ
fi(s∗i ,s
∗
i−)≤ fi(si,s∗i−) ∀ si ∈ Si(si−) (2.7)
A generalised Nash equilibrium, which, for simplicity, also refers to Nash equilibrium in
this thesis regardless of there exists constraints or not. If no player can improve its objective
function unilaterally without violating at least one of the coupled constraints, a vector of
collective actions calls Nash equilibrium.
2.1.3 Example of Nash equilibrium
A Cournot model [17] will be applied to demonstrate the process of obtaining Nash equilib-
rium in this section.
For a Cournot model, suppose the market is duopolistic that two ﬁrms competing in the
market producing homogeneous goods. These two ﬁrms, namely ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 will
simultaneously choose their respective output levels for their own best interests. Outputs
of these two ﬁrms’ are denoted by q1, q2, from feasible sets [0,+∞] for instance and total
production is accordingly as Q= q1+q2. They sell the goods at the market clearing price
π(Q) and for simplicity, suppose the market clearing price is a linear function of demand,
thus
π(Q) =max(0,a−bQ) (2.8)
where a and b are positive coefﬁcients that assumed to be given.
Hence, ﬁrm i′s total proﬁt is then
Ωi = qiπ(Q)− ci(qi), i= 1,2 (2.9)
where ci(qi) represents the cost of production for ﬁrm i when producing qi as output, which
is also assumed as a linear function of individual output, hence
ci(qi) = cqi (2.10)
where c is the linear production cost coefﬁcient.
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Given (2.8) and (2.10), (2.9) becomes
Ωi = qi(a−b
2
∑
i=1
qi)− cqi, i= 1,2 (2.11)
It is seen from (2.11) that each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is depending both on its own and opponent’s
output. The reaction functions for two ﬁrms would specify each ﬁrm’s optimal output level
q∗i for each ﬁxed output of its opponent qi−. And they can be obtained respectively by
differentiating the individual proﬁt function Ωi over its own decision variable qi:
V2(q1) =
a− c−bq1
2b
(2.12)
V1(q2) =
a− c−bq2
2b
(2.13)
The Nash equilibrium should satisfy q∗2 = V2(q
∗
1) and q
∗
1 = V1(q
∗
2) since only if under
the circumstance each player’s action is the best response to the other’s choice. Hence
Nash equilibrium can be analytically calculated and optimal outputs for two ﬁrms are
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
a−c
3b .
Suppose parameters a,b and c are equal to 40, 1 and 4, respectively. The Nash equilibrium
is accordingly as q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
a−c
3b = 12. Hence, the optimal outputs for two ﬁrms are 12, and
the proﬁt earned by each ﬁrm is 144 that is calculated according to (2.11).
2.1.4 Computing Nash equilibrium
Because the Cournot model being constructed above is differentiable and concave, the Nash
equilibrium is obtained by using ﬁrst order conditions. However, it was not the generally
correct way of reaching the Nash equilibrium according to [4] since there are other conditions
that have to be satisﬁed, otherwise the results cannot be regarded as Nash equilibrium. Hence,
we will outline the general process of obtaining Nash equilibrium in Algorithm 2.1.
Algorithm 2.1 [55] General way for reaching Nash equilibrium
1: Choose initial points for all players s0 = (s01, . . . ,s
0
N) and set k := 0
2: If sk satisfy termination criterion, STOP.
3: For all players, solving sk+1i from minsi fi(si,s
k
i−), s.t. si ∈ Si(ski−).
4: Update sk+1 = (sk+11 , . . . ,s
k+1
N ) and set k = k+1. Then go back to step 2.
From the Algorithm 2.1, totally N optimisations will be solved simultaneously at each
iteration because players are considered equal such that no one has the priority to make
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decisions ﬁrst. Speciﬁcally, at any iteration k, player i minimises its objective function
fi(si,sk−1i− ) to obtain the best response s
k
i when assuming all opponents’ actions are ﬁxed as
sk−1i− , which are the solutions of opponents from previous iteration. In doing so, we assume
each player knows the past moves of all opponents. Hence, the game whenever applying
Algorithm 2.1 is a perfect information game.
Furthermore, Algorithm 2.1 will generate a sequence of vectors: s0 → s1 → s2 → . . ..
And the solution vector at iteration k are compared with those from iteration k− 1 and
provided that the difference between the consecutive iterations is smaller than a threshold,
we say that results are converging. While based on the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium, if the
generated results are converging to a point s∗, this s∗ will be the Nash equilibrium. Therefore
we will adopt the method shown in Algorithm 2.1 to solve decentralised problems in the
following chapters and this manner is called iterative method hereafter for simplicity and
clarity.
Apart from solving the decentralised optimisations iteratively as Algorithm 2.1 demon-
strates, people could also obtain the KKT conditions of all players’ individual optimisation
problems and solve these KKTs together. This manner will be called ‘one-go’ method since
it could gain the optimal solutions for all players in the meantime. But as mentioned before,
the obtained results cannot guarantee to be Nash equilibrium unless they could be veriﬁed
according to iterative way.
To sum up, both iterative way and ‘one-go’ way are viable methods for obtaining Nash
equilibrium for decentralised optimisation. Nevertheless, the latter seems not efﬁcient
comparing to the former as its results cannot be ensured to be Nash unless using the former
for veriﬁcation.
2.1.5 Introduction of Q-learning: an algorithm for agent-based mod-
elling
Given the Algorithm 2.1 that introduced in Section 2.1.4, each player is assumed knowing past
moves of its opponents. Nonetheless, this may not always be the case in real-life scenarios.
Sometimes during the course of searching for the equilibrium, players have no idea about the
choices that their competitors will make. Under this circumstance, Algorithm 2.1 is no longer
applicable for solving the decentralised optimisation. But aside from game theory, agent-
based modelling is also a powerful tool to simulate the complex dynamic interactions among
large number of agents in a spatially well-deﬁned system. In corresponding agent-based
models, agents are constructed to be computational objects, which are modelled as interacting
over space and time according to some rules [19]. While these rules could be realised through
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use of artiﬁcial intelligence methods, such as reinforcement learning techniques [59] because
human intelligence manifests in the ability to learn. And according to Law of effect [21],
responses that have led to a satisfying effect in the past are more likely to occur again in
the future. As a result, in the case of no prior knowledge on each opponent’ past actions,
agents could experiment different actions that result in diverse performances and learn to ﬁnd
out those producing good outcomes. The above process displays the reinforcement learning
characteristic. After all, learning is one of the criteria for a mature cognitive architecture.
Reinforcement learning, one of the most active research streams in artiﬁcial intelligence,
is a computational approach to learning whereby an agent tries to maximise some notion of
reward in an environment [59]. While Q-learning, as a form of model-free reinforcement
learning, is a simple way for agents to learn how to act optimally [62].
The detailed formulation of Q-learning is discussed below. Suppose all agents play in
a repeated game. Let s˜t denote the state of the agent at the beginning of period t and st is
the action chosen by the agent in period t that is available in state s˜t . Qt(s˜,s) represents an
agent’s Q-value for s˜ ∈ S˜ and s ∈ S at the beginning of period t, where S˜ and S are respective
state space and action space. After the agent has selected action s in period t, Q-value is
updated as [62]:
Qt+1(s˜t ,s) = (1−α)Qt(s˜t ,s)+α(ωt + γ max
s′
Qt(s˜t+1,s′)) (2.14)
where ωt is the reward obtained in period t given the action s. There is in fact no exact
deﬁnition on the reward. The rule is to design it in a way that higher reward indicates more
desirable outcome.
α ∈ [0,1] is the learning rate that represents the relative weight for current performance
ωt in contrast with previous experience Qt . Therefore, if α is close to 1, it means the player
will rely more on current reward than the previous experience and vice versa.
And γ ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor, which is determined by how much the agent would
like to be affected by the future reward because maxQt(s˜t+1,s′) is the best Q-value for all
possible actions in state s˜t+1. Expect for the chosen action, Q-values in other unvisited states
and unvisited actions keep the same.
Given the Q-value, there are several ways for action selection [59]. The simplest rule is
to select the one with the highest Q-value among all the available actions given the current
state. This method will always exploit the action that currently with good performance. And
it spends no time at attempting other actions that may generate better results. However, one
important feature of Q-learning that we prefer is the ergodic process. Speciﬁcally, the agent in
Q-learning is better designed to have both explore and exploit ability, where explore indicates
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the agent should try as many actions as possible especially at early stage; while exploit
means the agent should favour those actions that have higher Q-values. As a consequence, a
trade-off between these two features is needed for each of the agent. Hence an alternative
comparing to the aforementioned rule is to perform greedily at most of the time, but choose
an action at random once in a while with small probability ε . This method is called ε-greedy.
Although this method is a popular mean for achieving both exploration and exploitation, a
major drawback is that it assumes all actions have the same possibility to be selected when it
intends to explore new choice. In other words, it is likely to choose the worst action as it is to
choose the second-best action, which is obviously not effective enough. A so-called softmax
action selection rule hence provides a solution addressing the above disadvantage: it will
make the probability of action as a weighted function of Q-value. And the most common
method that softmax rule uses is Boltzmann distribution, according to which, the probability
that the agent in period t chooses action s is as [59]:
Pr(s) =
e
Qt (s˜t ,s)
β
∑s′∈S e
Qt (s˜t ,s′)
β
where β is a positive parameter called the temperature.
Similar to the ‘reward’, the parameter β has no explicit deﬁnition either. But it needs to
be designed based on the iteration numbers such that β is large when iteration number is
small and is decreasing with the increasing of the iteration numbers. The reason is explained
as follows. At the beginning of the learning iterations, the agent should be encouraged to
explore in the action space S and try numerous actions because it has no knowledge of the
situation. Therefore, β is better to be large so that even some actions have brought good
results, their probabilities of being chosen again would not increase too much to impair
sampling other actions. Nonetheless with the increasing number of iterations, the agent
gains certain experiences and β should be small to take advantage of the accumulative
experience and efﬁciently favour those actions that lead to good rewards. Provided that the
above criterion for setting β is followed, each agent could ﬁnd a balance between exploration
and exploitation. Moreover, recalling that every ﬁnite strategic-form game will have a mix-
strategy Nash equilibrium [17], the game applying Q-learning will converge to a mix-strategy
Nash equilibrium considering that the above softmax selection rule is adopted.
Q-learning could also be simpliﬁed to have no record on past events and for those that
not memorising the states, the probability that the agent chooses action s at time period t
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changes to:
Pr(s) =
e
Qt (s)
β
∑s′∈S e
Qt (s′)
β
(2.15)
And the Q-value updating formula is simpliﬁed to:
Qt+1(s) = (1−α)Qt(s)+αωt (2.16)
Because the agent without memory cannot evaluate the effect on the future rewards given
the action it chooses in the current stage, the discount factor γ equals to zero. And the
learning rate α can be designed as variational for different actions under this circumstance.
For example, at the beginning of the learning process, we could set the learning rate for each
action to be 1, which is α(s) = 1,∀ s ∈ S. Therefore the agent would fully rely on the reward
ωt for updating Q-value because it does not have any experience from earlier time. The
more frequently the agent chooses a particular action s, the more the learning rate α(s) will
decrease in order to shift the weight from the current reward to the accumulative experience
that denoted by Q-value.
In summary, each agent in Q-learning should remember a parameter called Q-value
indicating the performances that determined by the agent’s past experiences for every chosen
strategy. Generally, Q-value is calculated as a weighted average of the rewards from the past
and is updated after every time the agent makes a decision. Based on the Q-values, each
agent probabilistically chooses its action. If the agent selects an action that makes itself
receive high payoff, this action’s new Q-value will be higher than before, which results in a
higher probability of being chosen the second time. The above process would continue until
a particular action’s probability reaches 1.
2.1.6 Example of Q-learning
The same example in Section 2.1.3 will be implemented using Q-learning. For the purpose
of comparison, we will also model the example in centralised way such that a single entity
maximises the total proﬁt from two ﬁrms to obtain the best total output to produce. Hence,
the objective function is:
Ω=Ω1+Ω2 = (40−Q)Q−4Q (2.17)
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Nash Q-learning Central way
α = 0.5 Q
∗ 24 21.2 18
Ω∗ 288 312.8 324
Table 2.1 Analytical results for equilibrium obtained from different ways
By differentiating the objective function (2.17) over Q, we have
∂Ω
∂Q
= 40−2Q−4= 0 (2.18)
Consequently the optimal total output Q∗ is 18. And corresponding total proﬁtΩ∗ is therefore
324.
For the Q-learning method, suppose each of two ﬁrms chooses production level from 0 to
40 and only integer quantities are allowed. Due to the probabilistic behaviour, the results
obtained given different simulation runs will not be the same. Hence we apply 10 simulation
runs to get the average results for ensuring credible results. And in each simulation run,
the total iteration is 2000, which means each ﬁrm will play the repeated Cournot game two
thousand times. Based on which, the temperature is designed as gradually decreasing:
β = 1000×0.99t (2.19)
The learning rate α is set to be 0.5 for all the actions and unchanged over the time, indicating
both ﬁrms value the current reward and previous performance equally. The total production
output from two ﬁrms and total proﬁt that Q-learning agents could earn are shown in Table 2.1,
and the analytical results of Nash equilibrium and centralised equilibrium are also displayed
for comparison.
It can be seen that Q-learning agents behave better-off than Nash equilibrium regarding
total proﬁt. But as discussed above, the result will not be deterministic and it could be better
than pure-strategy Nash equilibrium or worse than it. This exposes the evident disadvantage
of Q-learning method using softmax selection rule. Although the measure can be taken to
perform several simulation runs and obtain the average results, the randomness of the results
and the irreplicable of the process of ﬁnding the equilibrium are still concerning us.
2.2 Investing in the network in decentralised way
A couple of papers in the literature that mentioned in Chapter 1 applied decentralised
manner to solve transmission investment problems. Among which, the detailed mathematical
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formulation for [52] is given as below. fk represents the ﬂow at branch k, and by utilising
DC power ﬂow techniques,
fk =∑
i
Hk,(i)pi−∑
j
Hk,( j)d j,
where Hk,(i) and Hk,( j) are PTDFs coefﬁcients corresponding to generator i and demand
supplier j. In order to simplify the problem, the author ignores the bounds for generation
outputs, demands and the investment capacities. LetCi(pi) be the cost function for generation
i, and Bj(d j) is the net beneﬁt function for demand supplier j, centralised market clearing
process is as:
Φ=∑
i
Ci(pi)−∑
j
B j(d j)
s.t. ∑
i
pi =∑
j
d j : μe
∑
i
Hk,(i)pi−∑
j
Hk,( j)d j ≤ Fk : μk
(2.20)
where Fk is the capacity for branch k. And μe,μk are multipliers for power balance and power
ﬂow constraints, respectively. Moreover,
Ci(pi) = aipi+
1
2
bip2i , (2.21)
and
Bj(d j) = a jd j− 12b jd
2
j . (2.22)
Then the Lagrangian function for centralised economic dispatch is as:
Φ¯=∑
i
Ci(pi)−∑
j
B j(d j)+μe(∑
j
d j−∑
i
pi)+μk(∑
i
Hk,(i)pi−∑
j
Hk,( j)d j−Fk) (2.23)
Differentiating (2.23) over pi and d j yields respectively
pi =
1
bi
(
μe−ai−μk∑
i
Hk,(i)
)
, (2.24)
d j =
1
b j
(
−μe+a j +μk∑
j
Hk,( j)
)
. (2.25)
2.2 Investing in the network in decentralised way 21
Since power balance constraint must be satisﬁed, μe will be obtained as
μe =
1
∑i 1bi +∑ j
1
b j
(
∑
i
ai
bi
+∑
j
a j
b j
+∑μk(∑
i
Hk,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk,( j)
b j
)
)
. (2.26)
Furthermore, branch k′ is assumed congested; in other words, ﬂow f ′k will equal to its capacity
F ′k . Thus
F ′k =∑
i
Hk′,(i)pi−∑
j
Hk′,( j)d j. (2.27)
Substituting (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) into (2.27) leads to
F ′k =
1
∑i 1bi +∑ j
1
b j
(
∑
i
ai
bi
+∑
j
a j
b j
+∑μk(∑
i
Hk,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk,( j)
b j
)
)
×
(
∑
i
Hk′,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk′,( j)
b j
)
−∑
i
aiHk′,(i)
bi
−∑
j
a jHk′,( j)
b j
−∑μk∑
i
Hk,(i)Hk′,(i)
bi
−∑μk∑
j
Hk,( j)Hk′,( j)
b j
.
(2.28)
According to (2.28), relation between investment capacity and its marginal value of transmis-
sion can be obtained as
F =Θ1−Θ2μ, (2.29)
where
Θ1(k′) =
1
∑i 1bi +∑ j
1
b j
(
∑
i
ai
bi
+∑
j
a j
b j
)
×
(
∑
i
Hk′,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk′,( j)
b j
)
−∑
i
aiHk′,(i)
bi
−∑
j
a jHk′,( j)
b j
, (2.30)
Θ2(k′,k) =
(
∑
i
Hk,(i)Hk′,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk,( j)Hk′,( j)
b j
)
− 1
∑i 1bi +∑ j
1
b j(
∑
i
Hk,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk,( j)
b j
)
)
×
(
∑
i
Hk′,(i)
bi
+∑
j
Hk′,( j)
b j
)
. (2.31)
We could also transform (2.29) to
μ = Λ1−Λ2F, (2.32)
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where
Λ1 =Θ−12 Θ1, (2.33)
Λ2 =Θ−12 . (2.34)
Therefore, the centralised transmission investment problem over a single time period is:
min
p,d,F
(
C−B+ cF +μe(d−p)+μ(Hp−Hd−F)
)
, (2.35)
where c is the investment cost for transmission lines. For differentiating (2.35) over F gives
c= μ . Hence, centralised optimal investment capacity becomes
F∗ =Θ1−Θ2c (2.36)
While for a proﬁt maximising merchant company, its decentralised objective for a single
stage is given as:
max
F
μF− cF. (2.37)
Substituting (2.32) into (2.37) yields
max
F
(Λ1−Λ2F)F− cF. (2.38)
The corresponding ﬁrst order optimality condition is:
Λ1−2Λ2F− c= 0⇒ F∗merchant =
1
2
Λ−12 (Λ1− c) =
1
2
(Θ1−Θ2c) = 12F
∗. (2.39)
Consequently, given the applied assumptions, the investment capacity can be related linearly
with the marginal value of transmission. Moreover, decentralised merchant expansion
planning will result in under-investment situation comparing to centralised solution.
Next, we will review the formulation for [26]. For a game with N players that are
interested in investing in transmission system, player i will choose the investment decision si
from its pure strategy set Si. According to [26], the expansion capacity of the candidate lines
are pre-deﬁned. Therefore players can only choose investing with this value or not investing
at all; hence Si = {0,1}. In order to ﬁnd Nash equilibrium, player i would experiment every
action from the strategy space while assuming others’ choices are given. Then the total
capacity of the line is known as T = si+ si− . Given which, a simpliﬁed centralised model is
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implemented:
min∑aiPi
s.t.∑Pi =∑d j
−T <= f <= T
(2.40)
where ai and Pi are cost coefﬁcient and generation output for unit i. Constraints are guaran-
teeing demand is full served and ﬂow is within the proposed investment capacity. Suppose
unit i is connected at bus j, nodal price π j will be determined by the multiplier of power ﬂow
constraint based on the marginal pricing principle. As a result, player i could calculate and
record energy proﬁt from choosing the action si by solving (2.40), :
Pro f iti = (π j−ai)Pi (2.41)
After trying out the entire strategy space, each player is capable of locating the action gives
the maximum proﬁt. And the above process continues until ﬁnding a strategy proﬁle s∗ such
that
Pro f iti(s∗i ,s
∗
i−)≥ Pro f iti(si,s∗i−) ∀ si ∈ Si (2.42)
2.3 Conclusions
Since the deregulation has been observed all over the world during the last two decades,
we were devoted to propose methods for transmission investment within a decentralised
paradigm. Hence, we introduced game theory and learning algorithm that are both important
tools for simulating participants’ behaviours in Section 2.1. Firstly, we deﬁned what elements
required for constituting a game. Moreover, the ultimate goal for decentralised game is to
reach an agreement among self-interests, which could be interpreted in mathematical way as
Nash equilibrium. Therefore the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium along with an example of
computing Nash are provided. In addition, through repeated games, agents may manifest
learning ability from previous experiences; thus reinforcement learning especially Q-learning
is also explained in this section.
Furthermore, for the papers in the literature with respect to decentralised transmission
investment, we elaborated their mathematical formulations in Section 2.2. The authors in [52]
assumes
1. power ﬂow equals to capacity of the transmission line;
2. no upper/lower bounds for power outputs and for investment capacities.
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Given which, it derives the linear relationship between the optimal transmission capacity
and marginal value of transmission under decentralised paradigm. And the obtained results
also indicate that decentralised expansion capacity by merchant companies results in under-
investment situation comparing to the centralised solution.
While for [26], it pre-deﬁned candidate lines that can be invested in, possible expansion
capacities and potential investors. An exhaustive approach is employed for searching pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium for the transmission expansion game. However, the approach
taken in this paper has serious disadvantages. First of all, congestion surplus is not included
in the investors’ objective function. Moreover, each player’s optimal investment capacity
is not obtained by optimisation, but by experimentation over the entire strategy space. The
latter as a matter of fact yields a massive computational burden.
In conclusion, by reviewing these papers in the literature, we could understand in a more
straightforward way of what previous works have been done and more importantly, realise
what else we could do in the respect.
Chapter 3
Methods for solving transmission
investment problem in decentralised way
As a further step towards the liberalization of the electricity industry, decentralised and
market-driven transmission planning by self-interested entities should be encouraged and
facilitated. Consequently, we will investigate methods in this chapter so as to solve the
transmission investment problem in decentralised way. Speciﬁcally, each participant decides
capacity it intends to invest for each of the transmission line in order for obtaining its
maximum proﬁt. The ﬁnal capacity of the line will therefore be the sum of all individual
decisions. In doing so, individual participant pays the investment cost proportional to its own
decisions, and is also entitled to collect congestion surpluses that resulted from the price
differentials between buses according to the investing amount. This pattern of investment,
on one hand avoids the cost allocation difﬁculties that exist when centrally investing in
transmission network; on the other hand gives correct economic signal to all participants
since they pay and gain based on exactly what they propose to invest.
3.1 Analytical method
The easiest way for the transmission investment problem as far as we know is the analytical
method, which solves the optimality conditions from each player’s Lagrangian function.
Assuming generators are to make transmission investment decisions and for each of the
generators, it not only receives proﬁt from producing the energy but also from the transmission
investment. Its objective consequently is to ﬁnd optimal amount to invest to make the entire
proﬁt as large as possible.
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Fig. 3.1 Two-bus system
The 2-bus example will be used [31]. There are 2 areas in Figure 3.1: Borduria and
Syldavia. Each area has one bus that connects one generator and one demand. The marginal
cost functions for respective generators in Borduria and Syldavia are:
MCB = 10+0.01PB£/MWh, MCS = 13+0.02PS£/MWh,
where PB and PS denote the power outputs for Borduria and Syldavia, respectively. The
demand for each area is:
dB = 500MW, dS = 1500MW.
Initially, suppose there is no interconnection between two areas. In order to analytically solve
the problem, we will assume the locational marginal prices(LMPs for short) for both buses
equal to the marginal cost of local generators:
πB = 10+0.01PB, πS = 13+0.02PS.
Given no interconnection between two buses, consumers at Syldavia have to satisfy their
needs from the local expensive generator. Therefore,
πB = 10+0.01PB = 10+0.01×500= 15£/MWh,
πS = 13+0.02PS = 13+0.02×1500= 43£/MWh.
Obviously that price at Borduria is lower than it in Syldavia. The revenues that two generators
earn are:
RevenuegB = πB×PB = 15×500= 7500£/h,
RevenuegS = πS×PS = 43×1500= 64500£/h,
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where subscript gB, gS represent the generator at Borduria and Syldavia respectively. And
the operating costs, denoted by OC for serving local demands are obtained by integrating
corresponding marginal cost functions:
OCgB = 10PB+
1
2
0.01P2B = 10×500+
1
2
×0.01×5002 = 6250£/h,
OCgS = 13PS+
1
2
0.02P2S = 13×1500+
1
2
×0.02×15002 = 42000£/h.
As a result, the obtained proﬁts for both generators are calculated as:
ProﬁtgB = RevenuegB−OCgB = 7500−6250= 1250£/h,
ProﬁtgS = revenuegS−OCgS = 64500−42000= 22500£/h.
And the payment that local demand needs to pay is equal to the generator’s revenue at the
same bus:
PaymentdB = 7500£/h, PaymentdS = 64500£/h.
It is clear that no interconnection between two areas makes the generator at Syldavia
monopolise the area, which is inefﬁcient in economic point of view. Thereby, the transmission
line between two areas is expected to be built and the capacity is decided by individual
generator.
Suppose FgB, FgS denote the capacities that two generators put forward for the intercon-
nection, the total capacity will be :
Ft = FgB+FgS.
Due to the simplicity of the structure of this 2-bus system, we assume the power ﬂowed from
Borduria to Syldavia will equal the capacity of the transmission line. Hence the generation
outputs for two generators will be:
PB = dB+Ft = 500+(FgB+FgS),
PS = dS−Ft = 1500− (FgB+FgS).
(3.1)
The operating cost for each generator is obtained by:
OCgB = 10PB+ 120.01P
2
B = 10(500+(FgB+FgS))+
1
20.01(500+(FgB+FgS))
2,
OCgS = 13PS+ 120.02P
2
S = 13(1500− (FgB+FgS))+ 120.02(1500− (FgB+FgS))2.
(3.2)
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And the revenue of producing the energy can be calculated for each generator:
RevenuegB = πB×PB = (10+0.01(500+(FgB+FgS)))× (500+(FgB+FgS)),
RevenuegS = πS×PS = (13+0.02(1500− (FgB+FgS)))× (1500− (FgB+FgS)).
(3.3)
Then the proﬁt from power production will be the difference between revenue and operating
cost:
ProﬁtenergygB = revenuegB−OCgB,
ProﬁtenergygS = revenuegS−OCgS.
For the investment aspect, the individual generator pays the investment cost and also collects
the surplus due to the congestion in accordance with the capacity it is willing to invest.
Suppose investment cost is a linear function of the capacity proposed to built [31], the
respective cost that denoted by IC is:
ICgB = c×FgB, ICgS = c×FgS, (3.4)
where c(£/MWh) is the linear investment cost coefﬁcient. The total congestion surplus(denoted
by CS) resulted from congestion is given by:
CS= (πS−πB)×Ft .
Then each generator collects partial congestion surplus:
CSgB = (πS−πB)×FgB, CSgS = (πS−πB)×FgS. (3.5)
Thus, the proﬁt from the transmission investment will be:
ProﬁttransmissiongB = CSgB− ICgB,
ProﬁttransmissiongS = CSgS− ICgS.
So the overall proﬁt for each generator is the sum of proﬁt from producing the energy and
the proﬁt of investing the line:
ProﬁtgB = Proﬁt
energy
gB +Proﬁt
transmission
gB = revenuegB−OCgB+CSgB− ICgB, (3.6a)
ProﬁtgS = Proﬁt
energy
gS +Proﬁt
transmission
gS = revenuegS−OCgS+CSgS− ICgS. (3.6b)
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FgB FgS λgB λgS
1 0 0 -29 6
2 580 0 0 11.8
3 0 -150 -32 0
4 711 -328 0 0
Table 3.1 Analytical results for 2 generators’ transmission investment
According to (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), power outputs and nodal prices can all be
transformed as functions of investment capacities FgB,FgS. Therefore, the only decision
variables in (3.6) are individual investment capacity, which makes (3.6) concave.
In order for making sure that individual decision on the transmission capacity is larger
or equal to zero, each generator involves the non-negative constraint with respect to its
investment variable when constructing Lagrangian function:
minLgB =min−ProﬁtgB−λgBFgB =min−(revenuegB−OCgB+CSgB− ICgB)−λgBFgB,
minLgS =min−ProﬁtgS−λgSFgS =min−(revenuegS−OCgS+CSgS− ICgS)−λgSFgS.
The KKT conditions for above two Lagrangian functions are:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂LgB
∂FgB
= 0⇒ FgB20 +
FgS
50 −λgB−29= 0
∂LgS
∂FgS
= 0⇒ Fgs25 +
FgB
100 −λgS+6= 0
λgB
∂LgB
∂λgB
= 0⇒ λgBFgB = 0
λgS
∂LgS
∂λgS
= 0⇒ λgSFgS = 0
(3.7)
Suppose we only consider 1h period and linear investment cost c is 4£/MWh [31], solutions
from solving (3.7) are displayed in Table 3.1. Because of the complementarity nature of
the last two equations in (3.7), solutions are not unique. But due to the non-negativity
requirement for the individual investment capacity and the Lagrangian multipliers, only the
result of row 2 in Table 3.1 is feasible. Moreover, the obtained results are Nash equilibrium
due to the concavity of individual objective function.
The result indicates that generator at Syldavia prefers not to invest on the interconnection
since it provides relatively expensive energy comparing to generator at Borduria. If no
interconnection exists, it could monopolise the area and receive much higher proﬁt. While the
generator at Borduria chooses to invest 580MW because the interconnection would increase
both power exporting from Borduria and the nodal price at Borduria, which consequently
raise its energy proﬁt. Nevertheless, the generator at Borduria cannot invest too much as the
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congestion surplus it collects is related to the price differential that is inversely proportional
to the capacity of the interconnection.
The total capacity Ft for the interconnection will be 580+0= 580MW . Due to existence
of the transmission line, the demand at Syldavia could seek to cheaper source of energy from
Borduria, which causes the generation outputs become:
PB = dB+Ft = 500+580= 1080MW,
PS = dS−Ft = 1500−580= 920MW.
Thus LMPs for both buses are:
πB =MCB = 10+0.01PB = 10+0.01×1080= 20.8£/MW,
πS =MCS = 13+0.02PS = 13+0.02×920= 31.4£/MW.
As a result, the proﬁt from producing energy for each of the generator can be calculated as:
ProﬁtenergygB = revenuegB−OCgB = 5832£,
ProﬁtenergygS = revenuegS−OCgS = 8464£.
The corresponding congestion surplus received by each generator depends on the price
differential between two buses and the investment amount proposed:
CSgB = (πS−πB)×FgB = (31.4−20.8)×580= 6148£,
CSgS = (πS−πB)×FgS = (31.4−20.8)×0= 0£.
The investment costs that two generators pay are respectively:
ICgB = c×FgB = 4×580= 2320£,
ICgS = c×FgS = 4×0= 0£.
Therefore, the proﬁt obtained for each of the generator given interconnection is:
ProﬁtgB = Proﬁt
energy
gB +Proﬁt
transmission
gB = 9660£,
ProﬁtgS = Proﬁt
energy
gS +Proﬁt
transmission
gS = 8464£.
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no interconnection having interconnection
Proﬁt for generator at Borduria 1250 9660
Proﬁt for generator at Syldavia 22500 8464
Payment for demand at Borduria 7500 10400
Payment for demand at Syldavia 64500 40952
Table 3.2 Results without/with interconnection
The payments that demands pay are:
PaymentB = πB×dB = 20.8×500= 10400£,
PaymentS = πS×dS = 31.4×1500= 40952£.
Table 3.2 compares the proﬁts and payments for two generators and two demands under no
interconnection and having interconnection cases.
According to Table 3.2, the new transmission line does break the monopolistic status of
generator at Syldavia by reducing its proﬁt and lower accordingly the payment that demand
at Syldavia has to pay. And because generator at Borduria produces more MW than its local
demand, the nodal price at Borduria increases which results in higher payment for the demand
at this bus but higher proﬁt earned by the local generator comparing to no interconnection
situation.
3.2 Using iterative method to solve decentralised transmis-
sion investment problem
In Section 3.1, we analytically solve the decentralised transmission investment problem.
Bounds for individual investment capacities are taken into account by adding them into La-
grangian functions with corresponding multipliers as penalty terms, but there is no guarantee
that they would be satisﬁed. More importantly, when gathering KKTs from each player’s
Lagrangian function and solve them simultaneously, the obtained solutions are generally
stationary points, not always Nash equilibrium [4].
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In this section, the same 2-bus example shown in Figure 3.1 is solved using the iterative
method that discussed in Algorithm 2.1. For two generators, the total proﬁts are as:
ProﬁtgB = Proﬁt
energy
gB +Proﬁt
transmission
gB
= πBPB−OCgB+(πS−πB)FgB− cFgB,
ProﬁtgS = Proﬁt
energy
gS +Proﬁt
transmission
gS
= πSPS−OCgS+(πS−πB)FgS− cFgS.
(3.8)
Via the same assumptions Section 3.1 applies, the only variables in (3.8) are FgB,FgS. And
because individual objective function includes variable of the other generator, we need to
have initial guess on FgB,FgS, and generators should also be well informed of what each
player chose in the previous step. Then each player could optimise its own objective function
to obtain the best response when assuming the competitor chooses the same action as in the
previous iteration. As is known, this method would then proceed iteratively until no one
wishes to change its action given the other’s choice. The result accordingly reaches the Nash
equilibrium.
Given random initial values F0gB,F
0
gS, the results after convergence are the same as those in
Section 3.1. The generator at Borduria invests 580MW in order to transfer power to Syldavia
to have more proﬁt. Similarly, generator at Syldavia does not plan to invest in consideration
of its own proﬁt.
Both methods in Section 3.1 and 3.2 take some assumptions. They simplify the problem
by supposing power ﬂow equals to the capacity of the line. By doing so, the congestion
surplus that individual generator could collect equals to the price differential times its own
investment capacity. But in real network, ﬂows should satisfy some speciﬁc rules so that they
do not necessarily reach the maximum capacity of the line. This issue has to be addressed in
the following sections.
They also assume that nodal prices are the marginal costs of local generators so that the
nodal price for each bus can be expressed as a linear function of the power output at the same
bus. However, it does not always hold especially for large system. Thus way to deal with
nodal prices becomes a conundrum in later study.
3.3 Iterative method with discrete action set
Above two methods both employ some assumptions that are possibly not true in other systems.
Therefore, we are devoted to remove those assumptions in the following sections.
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Firstly, power ﬂows will not assume equaling to the capacity; hence the total congestion
surplus from each of the line shall be the price differential between two buses times the real
power ﬂow. Objective function for each generator would accordingly be much more difﬁcult
to tackle since individual congestion surplus have to be denoted as an inverse function to
express its quota from the total surplus.
Secondly, LMPs will not be decided by local generators under the following circum-
stances:
1. there is no local generator at particular bus or more than one at some bus;
2. local generators are not dispatched or fully dispatched.
Real LMPs are unknown until the market is centrally cleared by minimising the total operating
cost(suppose the demand is inelastic) such that power scheduling are obtained. And suppose
losses are neglected, nodal prices can accordingly be calculated based on DC OPF model [1].
Hence in order to remove the assumptions used in previous sections, we will solve the
problem in centralised manner to obtain the real ﬂows, power schedules and nodal prices. But
the transmission investment decisions still have to be determined by each generator. To this
end, we propose a new method and be applied in a 3-bus system [31] shown in Figure 3.2.
Fig. 3.2 Three-bus system
We assume there is no transmission lines in the system yet and let G be number of
generators, n be number of buses, NoBr be number of candidate branches, pi is the power
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Bus Capacity(MW) ai(£/MWh) bi(£/MWh2)
1 8000 80 0.02
2 11000 80 0.0135
3 8000 80 0.0175
Table 3.3 Cost coefﬁcients for 3-bus system
Bus Demand(MW)
1 0
2 10000
3 2500
Table 3.4 Demands for 3-bus system
output for generator i, where i= 1, . . . ,G. Fki is the investment decision made by generator i
for branch k. fk and Tk are the power ﬂow and capacity of the branch k, where k= 1, . . . ,NoBr,
and Tk = ∑Gi=1Fki .
According to Figure 3.2, the system has three buses, each of which connects one generator
and one demand. Hence, n = 3, and G = 3. Cost coefﬁcients of generators and demands
for three buses are shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. Based on the conﬁguration of the
generators and demands, generator at bus 1(generator 1 for short) would receive zero proﬁt
before investment on transmission network since there is no demand at the same bus; on
the contrary, generator 2 could beneﬁt a lot without interconnection due to its highest local
demand.
There are three candidate branches, namely NoBr = 3 for generators making investment
decisions. The reference direction for power ﬂows is illustrated in Figure 3.2. And the
reactance for each candidate branch is displayed in Table 3.5.
In this method, a discrete set [0,2400] is applied from which each generator chooses its
own investment capacities. Let NoA denote number of actions within the set, if the granularity
is 1200, generators can select among: 0,1200,2400. Or a smaller gap is used, for example
400, the NoA is accordingly 7 and candidate actions are 0,400,800,1200,1600,2000,2400.
Therefore, each generator will have ﬁnite choices for investment and the number of choices
Branch Connecting bus Reactance(Ω)
1 1-2 0.2
2 2-3 0.1
3 1-3 0.2
Table 3.5 Reactances for different branches
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depends on the selection of granularity, which is a trade-off between accuracy of the results
and the computation time.
As discussed at the beginning of this section, power ﬂows do not necessarily be the
capacities of the lines. Instead, they will equal to the Generation Shift Factors(GSF) times
power injection at each bus [34]. The GSF [54], based on the dc power ﬂow method, is the
relative change in the power ﬂow on a particular line due to an injection and withdrawal of
power on a pair of buses. Given the reactances shown in Table 3.5, GSF in this 3-bus system
is:
GSF =
⎡
⎢⎣0 −0.6 −0.40 0.4 −0.4
0 −0.4 −0.6
⎤
⎥⎦
Assuming others’ investment capacities are ﬁxed, each generator picks up the ﬁrst candiate
action for each branch. Total capacities for the network would subsequently be known. Based
on which, the system operator clears the market by minimising the operating cost and the
formulation is presented in (3.9).
minp1,p2,p3, f1, f2, f3∑
G
i=1 aipi+
1
2bip
2
i
0≤ pi ≤ pmaxi
−Tk ≤ fk ≤ Tk
∑Gi=1 pi = ∑
n
j=1 d j⎡
⎢⎣ f1f2
f3
⎤
⎥⎦= GSF×
⎡
⎢⎣p1−d1p2−d2
p3−d3
⎤
⎥⎦
(3.9)
Power productions, ﬂows and nodal prices are obtained by solving (3.9). The generator
is consequently able to calculate the total proﬁt the ﬁrst chosen action brings based on (3.8).
The remaining candidate actions are then tried in turns by the generator. Given the new
capacities, system operator solves (3.9) and the total proﬁt for each of the action will be
recorded. After trying every candidate action from the set, the generator could identify the
one that produces the maximum proﬁt. Each of the generators will repeat the aforementioned
process and update their investment capacities for next iteration until no one can beneﬁt by
deviating its strategies unilaterally. The results if converged will reach the Nash equilibrium.
Due to the fact that power ﬂows are not certainly equal to the capacity in this 3-bus
example, the congestion surplus for branch k will be related to the real power ﬂow instead of
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Bus Power output p, MW LMP, £/MW
1 1461 109.22
2 6922 173.45
3 4117 152.04
Branch Power ﬂow f ,MW Investment capacity T ,MW
1 1200 1200
2 -1878 2400
3 261 1200
Table 3.6 Results with granularity 1200
Branch 1 Capacity(MW) Branch 2 Capacity(MW) Branch 3 Capacity(MW)
F11 1200 F
2
1 0 F
3
1 1200
F12 0 F
2
2 0 F
3
2 0
F13 0 F
2
3 2400 F
3
3 0
∑F 1200 ∑F 2400 ∑F 1200
Table 3.7 Individual investment capacities obtained with granularity 1200
the capacity :
CSk = Δπ × fk.
For example, for branch 1 that connects bus 1 and 2, the power ﬂow is f1, and the total
congestion surplus is therefore (π2−π1)× f1, where π1,π2 are LMP for bus 1 and 2. Hence
share of congestion surplus from branch 1 by generator i is as:
CS1i = (π2−π1)× f1×
F1i
T1
. (3.10)
Likewise, each generator could receive congestion surpluses associated with the power ﬂows
and the corresponding capacities it proposes on other two branches.
Suppose 1h time horizon is considered and linear investment cost c is 15£/MWh [31].
We will implement the method discussed in this section with three different granulari-
ties:1200,800 and 400, and the results are shown in Table 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11.
Tables 3.7, 3.9 and 3.11 show the decentralised investment decisions for each generator
given different granularities. Due to the highest local demand, generator 2 invests in 0MW
on every candidate branch for all granularities so that it could monopoly the bus 2 and obtain
higher proﬁt. However, there is no demand at bus 1, which forces the generator 1 to invest
based on different granularities on branch 1 and 3 in order to serve the demand at bus 2 and
3. But it chooses not to invest on branch 2 that connects bus 2 and 3 to avoid generator 3
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Bus Power output p,MW LMP, £/MW
1 2148 122.96
2 6296 164.99
3 4056 150.98
Branch Power ﬂow f ,MW Investment capacity T ,MW
1 1600 1600
2 -2104 2400
3 548 800
Table 3.8 Results with granularity 800
Branch 1 Capacity(MW) Branch 2 Capacity(MW) Branch 3 Capacity(MW)
F11 1600 F
2
1 0 F
3
1 800
F12 0 F
2
2 0 F
3
2 0
F13 0 F
2
3 2400 F
3
3 0
∑F 1600 ∑F 2400 ∑F 800
Table 3.9 Individual investment capacities obtained with granularity 800
Bus Power output p,MW LMP, £/MW
1 2200 124.00
2 6400 166.40
3 3900 148.25
Branch Power ﬂow f ,MW Investment capacity T ,MW
1 1600 1600
2 -2000 2000
3 600 800
Table 3.10 Results with granularity 400
Branch 1 Capacity(MW) Branch 2 Capacity(MW) Branch 3 Capacity(MW)
F11 1600 F
2
1 0 F
3
1 800
F12 0 F
2
2 0 F
3
2 0
F13 0 F
2
3 2000 F
3
3 0
∑F 1600 ∑F 2000 ∑F 800
Table 3.11 Individual investment capacities obtained with granularity 400
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also transfer power to demand at bus 2. As for generator 3, it prefers to serve the demand
at bus 2 and its local demand itself; hence it only proposes to invest on branch 2. Given all
the individual investment decisions, the ﬁnal scheduling, ﬂows and LMPs are displayed in
Tables 3.6, 3.8 and 3.10.
Using this method, nodal prices are no longer marginal costs of local generators, instead,
they are obtained accurately from centrally market clearing process. Also the congestion
surpluses that generators receive are not related to the capacity of the line but to the real
power ﬂows. Removing those two constraints is the main improvement of this method.
In conclusion, when ﬁxed other players’ choices, each single player experiments every
action combinations from the discrete set to spot the one that could give the maximum proﬁt.
However, the computation time for this method will be consuming due to the ergodic feature.
In this case, for example, every generator needs to solve (3.9) NoANoBr times at each iteration,
and what’s worse, the time consuming drawback will get exacerbated to a great extent in
large system.
3.4 Method using Q-learning
Each generator in Section 3.3 would try every combination of actions from the given set in
each of the iterations so as to pick out the optimal capacity for investment that produces the
maximum proﬁt. This fully ergodic feature calls for extremely long computation time. As a
result, we will propose another method using Q-learning this section to solve the decentralised
transmission investment problem. Comparing to the method in Section 3.3, the players using
Q-learning also choose actions from a given discrete set, but based on probability distribution.
Hence, each generator only selects one action at each iteration and then participate with
the chosen action into the market clearing process. This will save so much time and more
importantly, the way of choosing actions based on probability distribution is called mixed
strategy, which in game theory, has been proved for the convergence of the results [17].
When applying Q-learning, each generator will build its own index Q-value for recording
the performance of the chosen action at each iteration, based on which, the probability
distribution will be updated according to (2.15). Therefore, for those actions that provide
high reward, the chance for being chosen the second time is enhanced. The same 3-bus
example is implemented in this section. We choose 2000 to be learning iterations, and β
is designed as 1000× 0.99t , where t is the current iteration. Therefore, β is large at the
beginning of learning process to facilitate exploration on different actions and would decrease
for favouring those who perform well in accumulative Q-value. Thus, Q-learning is not fully
ergodic.
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The learning rate α is set to be 0.6. This indicates that at each iteration, the reward
obtained in current iteration weighs 60% and the rest are determined by Q-value. The action
set for each generator is [0,2400] and granularity is 400 which are the same as Section 3.3.
But because Q-learning only needs short computation time due to its incomplete ergodic
characteristic, it is free to use much smaller gap.
Initially, each generator chooses its own decisions given the equal probability distribution,
and the capacity T1,T2,T3 are known. Then the market is cleared by solving (3.9) for
obtaining power schedules, ﬂows and nodal prices. The total proﬁt for each generator could
consequently be calculated and in terms of which, the performance index Q-value for the
chosen action is updated in accordance with (2.16) to renew the distribution. The probability
for the actions that give high proﬁt will be increased until a particular action’s probability
reaches 1.
The results obtained from method using Q-learning are shown in Table 3.12 and 3.13.
The generator 2 still invests 0 MW according to Table 3.13 as the best reply. For generator 1,
it invests on 3 branches. There is no doubt that it will invest on branch 1 and 3 to respectively
serve demand at bus 2 and 3. As for the investment on branch 2, it is unwise intuitively
since this decision will facilitate generator 3 transferring power to demand at bus 2 which
consequently reduce the power produced by generator 1. However, producing too much
would make the price at bus 1 higher than bus 3 and force generator 1 to lose the cheapest
place. Therefore, for the sake of proﬁt maximisation, investing on 3 branches becomes
the best response of generator 1 given what others’ choices. Table 3.12 veriﬁes the above
analysis as the price at bus 1 is very close to the price at bus 3. If generator 1 is still greedy
to produce more power, it will eventually lose more.
Similarly, for generator at bus 3, investing on branch 2 could make the generator exporting
power to demand at bus 2. And in order for serving the local demand more, it has no intention
to invest on branch 3. The capacity for branch 1, however, should be out of the consideration
of the total proﬁt. Since more power output does not necessarily produce more proﬁt, the
optimisation tool shall be applied to ﬁnd the optimal for making the sum of the proﬁt from
production and investment highest.
For the method in Section 3.3, it will always generate deterministic results considering
the same initial values. And the ﬁnal results if converging will be the Nash equilibrium.
Method using Q-learning, on the contrary, is different. The results it produces are random.
Hence sometimes results are better than Nash equilibrium while sometimes are not. This is
the inevitable drawback of Q-leaning when probabilistically choosing actions.
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Bus Power output p,MW LMP, £/MW
1 3000 140.00
2 6000 161.00
3 3500 141.25
Branch Power ﬂow f ,MW Investment capacity T ,MW
1 2000 2000
2 -2000 2000
3 1000 1200
Table 3.12 Results from method using Q-learning
Branch 1 Capacity(MW) Branch 2 Capacity(MW) Branch 3 Capacity(MW)
F11 1200 F
2
1 400 F
3
1 1200
F12 0 F
2
2 0 F
3
2 0
F13 800 F
2
3 1600 F
3
3 0
∑F 2000 ∑F 2000 ∑F 1200
Table 3.13 Individual investment capacities obtained from method using Q-learning
3.5 Iterative method with continuous investment capacity
In Section 3.3 and 3.4, a discrete action set is used for each player to choose its actions.
But the procured capacity cannot reach the real optimal solution but end up with the closest
integer it could according to different granularities of the action set.
Therefore, we will propose a new method this section to treat the investment capacities
as continuous variables. Unlike the 2-bus example, power outputs, ﬂows and nodal prices
are not able to be expressed as functions of the individual investment decisions. Therefore
a two-level structure is constructed to deal with those unknown variables and the coupled
constraints involving all players.
In the ﬁrst level, individual investment capacities are assumed as given, e.g. equal to the
values from previous step. Power scheduling and ﬂows are variables that will be centrally
solved by system operator according to (3.9). After obtaining production outputs, nodal
prices can be calculated. Also power ﬂows are determined.
Then the model moves to the second level. Given the nodal prices and ﬂows derived
above, each generator determines the optimal capacities to invest by maximising its proﬁt
subject to bounded constraints for individual investment capacities. These new capacities
will accordingly change economic dispatches and nodal prices in the ﬁrst level optimisation,
which subsequently alter the decentralised investment capacities.
Iteration will then proceed as indicated above until power outputs and individual invest-
ment capacities converge and neither of them wish to deviate from previous decisions. Given
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Bus Power output p,MW LMP, £/MW
1 2673 133.46
2 6008 161.11
3 3819 146.84
Branch Power ﬂow f ,MW Investment capacity T ,MW
1 1868 2295
2 -2125 2125
3 805 805
Table 3.14 Results from continuous iterative method
Branch 1 Capacity(MW) Branch 2 Capacity(MW) Branch 3 Capacity(MW)
F11 765 F
2
1 1277 F
3
1 163
F12 765 F
2
2 371 F
3
2 163
F13 765 F
2
3 477 F
3
3 479
∑F 2295 ∑F 2125 ∑F 805
Table 3.15 Individual investment capacities obtained from continuous iterative method
the system in Figures 3.2, results shown in Table 3.14 and 3.15 reach the Nash equilibrium.
It can be seen that the equilibrium this method obtains looks different from previous ones.
It is because for previous methods in Section 3.3 and 3.4, the goal of each generator is to
maximise the proﬁt both from energy and network investments. So for some generators, such
as generator at bus 2, they would rather not invest and consequently beneﬁt nothing from
investments in exchange for more proﬁt obtained from the power production. The method
in this section, however, only maximise the proﬁt from investments since power schedules
and LMPs are obtained already in the ﬁrst level and can only be treated as parameters in the
second level optimisation. Hence congestion surpluses become the only source of income,
which push all generators to invest on every branch for having the maximum investment
proﬁts.
3.6 Comparison among proposing methods in the 3-bus
system
All methods in this chapter are using decentralised way to decide network investment capaci-
ties, which requires independent generators maximising their own proﬁts. The centralised
paradigm, however, will let system operator make investment decisions by minimising the op-
erating cost plus investment cost subject to system constraints. The formulation of centralised
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network planning for the 3-bus system shown in Figure 3.2 is given in (3.11).
minp1,p2,p3, f1, f2, f3,F1,F2,F3∑
G
i=1 aipi+
1
2bip
2
i +∑
NoBr
k=1 cFk
0≤ pi ≤ pmaxi
−Fk ≤ fk ≤ Fk
∑Gi=1 pi = ∑
n
j=1 d j⎡
⎢⎣ f1f2
f3
⎤
⎥⎦= GSF×
⎡
⎢⎣p1−d1p2−d2
p3−d3
⎤
⎥⎦
(3.11)
where Fk denotes the investment capacity for branch k proposed by system operator.
The performance of the methods in this chapter implementing in the 3-bus system is
displayed in Table 3.16, which compares power outputs, total investment capacity of each
branch, and total cost of the system under centralised and decentralised paradigm. Given
the centralised structure, cost of clearing the power market and expanding the transmission
system will both be taken into account; hence it will essentially give the lowest total cost.
While results from proposing decentralised methods are all close to those under centralised
transmission planning. And the similar total cost produced by both paradigms especially
demonstrate that the proposing decentralised methods behave well in terms of social efﬁciency.
3.7 Proof on Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Almost all the decentralised methods proposed in this chapter use iterative manners for
solving multiple optimisations. Given which, the obtained results are deterministic for
the same starting point. Moreover, if the results converge, they will be Nash equilibrium.
These are the signiﬁcant advantages comparing to Q-learning method when probabilistically
choosing actions. However, pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist sometimes [17],
therefore, it will be very useful to prove the existence in advance to avert exhausted search in
a system that does not have any Nash. But it is noted that even the existence of Nash has
been conﬁrmed, it is still possible of failing to ﬁnd it.
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Centraliased
results
2-level
results
Q-learning
0:400:2400
Iterative dis-
crete method
0:400:2400
Power output,
p1,MW
2878 2673 3000 2200
Power output,
p2,MW
5819 6008 6000 6400
Power output,
p3,MW
3803 3819 3500 3900
Investment ca-
pacity T1,MW
1987 2295 2000 1600
Investment ca-
pacity T2,MW
2194 2125 2000 2000
Investment ca-
pacity T3,MW
890 805 1200 800
Total cost, £ 1.5140×106 1.5211 ×
106
1.5182 ×
106
1.5240×106
Difference in
total cost, %
0.47 0.28 0.66
Table 3.16 Results comparison under both paradigms
3.7.1 Nash existence proof on the 2-bus system
For any non-cooperative game, suppose there are N players, each of which has pure strategy
set (Si)Ni=1 and respective actions are (si)
N
i=1. The best response function for action si given
other players’ action si− is deﬁned as
Vi(si−) := {si|Ωi(si,si−) is maximized, for si ∈ Si(si−)} , (3.12)
where Ωi(si,si−) is the payoff (objective) function.
In order for proving the existence of Nash equilibrium, Theorem 3.1, Lemma 3.1 and 3.2
are introduced below.
Theorem 3.1. [32] If x →V (x) deﬁnes an upper hemi-continuous1 point-to-set mapping [3]
of a compact convex set S onto itself such that each V (x) is compact and convex, then there
exists some x∗ ∈ S such that x∗ ∈V (x∗) [Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem].
Lemma 3.1. [60] The Cartesian product of nonempty convex and compact sets is a nonempty
convex and compact set.
1A point-to-set mapping is said to be upper hemi-continuous at x0 if every sequence in which x→ x0 has a
limit point which lies in the image set of x0 [3].
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Lemma 3.2. [32] The Cartesian product of a ﬁnite family of upper hemi-continuous point-
to-set mapping is upper hemi-continuous.
Next, we will prove that according to Theorem 3.1, Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 indicated above,
Nash existence could be ensured by Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. If for any player i, si− → Vi(si−) is an upper hemi-continuous point-to-set
mapping of a compact convex set Si onto itself such that each Vi(si−) is compact and convex,
then there exists an Nash equilibrium s∗ := (s∗i )Ni=1 for the game.
Proof. This proof is based on [40]. According to (3.12), we have
Vi(si−) =
{
si ∈ Si(si−)|Ωi(si,si−)≥Ωi(s′i,si−), ∀ s′i ∈ Si(si−)
}
.
The Cartesian product of {Vi(si−)}Ni=1 and {Si}Ni=1 are as
V
(
(si)Ni=1
)
:=V1(s1−)×V2(s2−)×·· ·×VN(sN−).
and
S := S1×S2×·· ·×SN .
Let s := (si)Ni=1, because s ∈ S and V (s) ∈ S, s →V (s) would be a point-to-set mapping
of S onto itself. In addition, given that si− →Vi(si−) is an upper hemi-continuous point-to-set
mapping, s →V (s) is accordingly an upper hemi-continuous point-to-set mapping based on
Lemma 3.2. Furthermore, if both Vi(si−) and Si are convex and compact sets, Lemma 3.1
guarantees that V (s) and S are also convex and compact sets. Therefore a ﬁxed point s∗ is
ensured by Theorem 3.1 such that s∗ ∈V (s∗).
By the deﬁnition of generalised Nash equilibrium in Section 2.1.2, we know that s∗ =
(s∗i )Ni=1 is a Nash equilibrium, if and only if s
∗
i ∈Vi(s∗i−), ∀i. This implies
(s∗i )
N
i=1 ∈V1(s∗1−)×V2(s∗2−)×·· ·×VN(s∗N−),
which means that Nash equilibrium exist provided that there exists a s∗, such that s∗ ∈
V (s∗).
Suppose method in Section 3.2 is employed in the 2-bus system shown in Figure 3.1, we
will prove the Proposition 3.1 according to Theorem 3.2 for guaranteeing the existence of
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. For the 2-bus system introduced in Figure 3.1, if the interconnection
between two buses is assumed congested, LMPs are marginal costs of local generators and
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FgB and FgS belong to a compact and convex set F, this 2-player non-cooperative game on
transmission line investment decisions has an Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We assume the interconnection between two buses is congested, power ﬂow f would
equal to the capacity. The objective functions for two generators are:
ProﬁtgB = πBpB− (aBpB+ 12bBp
2
B)+(πS−πB)FgB− cFgB, (3.13a)
ProﬁtgS = πSpS− (aSpS+ 12bSp
2
S)+(πS−πB)FgS− cFgS. (3.13b)
LMPs are supposed to be the marginal costs of local generators, hence[
πB
πS
]
=
[
aB+bBpB
aS+bSpS
]
. (3.14)
Also because of the KCL constraints, the power generated in each bus will equal to the local
demand plus the power injected to the network:
pB = dB+FgB+FgS, pS = dS−FgB−FgS. (3.15)
Substituting (3.14) and (3.15) into (3.13) gives
ΩgB(FgB,FgS) = FgB(−
1
2
bB−bS)FgB+
[
aS−aB− c+bS(dS−FgS)
]FgB+ constant,
(3.16a)
ΩgS(FgS,FgB) = FgS(−
1
2
bS−bB)FgS+[aS−aB− c−bB(dB+FgB)]FgS+ constant.
(3.16b)
It is clear that Ωi(Fi,Fi−) is concave, while the concavity of the objective function Ωi(Fi,Fi−)
and the convexity of the set F guarantee that Vi(Fi−) is either a point or a convex set [42].
Moreover, because Fi− ∈ F, and the best response function for Fi given Fi− is as
Vi(Fi−) := {Fi|Ωi(Fi,Fi−) is maximized, for Fi ∈ F} ,
Fi− → Vi(Fi−) is consequently a mapping of set F onto itself. In addition, let us deﬁne a
limit point F0i for any sequence path Fi− → F0i−, then
F0i ∈
{
F0i | lim
Fi−→F0i−
Ωi(Fi,Fi−) is maximized, for F0i ∈ F
}
.
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The continuity of Ωi(Fi,Fi−) ensures that
lim
Fi−→F0i−
Ωi(Fi,Fi−) =Ωi(Fi,F0i−),
which implies that F0i ∈Vi(F0i−). Since Vi(F0i−) is the image set of F0i−, Fi− →Vi(Fi−) is an
upper hemi-continuity mapping. In conclusion, all the criteria required by Theorem 3.2 are
satisﬁed. The Nash equilibrium consequently exist in this 2-bus system given method in
Section 3.2.
3.7.2 Nash existence proof on the 3-bus system
In this section, we will work on proving Proposition 3.2 based on Theorem 3.3 that stated
below.
Proposition 3.2. For the 3-bus system introduced in Figure 3.2, if for any player i, its
decentralised investment capacities Fi belong to a nonempty compact and convex set F,
this 3-player non-cooperative game on transmission line investment decisions has Nash
equilibrium.
For all the methods applied in the 3-bus system, power ﬂows are no longer equal to
capacity, which makes the congestion surpluses in the individual proﬁt function become
inverse functions. For example, the total congestion surplus from branch 1 that connects bus
1 and 2 is:
CS1 = (π2−π1) f1.
Hence, generator at bus 1 would receive its share:
CS1gen1 =CS
1× F
1
1
F11 +F
1
2 +F
1
3
.
Because of the inverse functions, individual proﬁt function is much more complicated than
those in 2-bus system. Therefore, a weaker condition described in Theorem 3.3 is introduced
for guaranteeing Nash existence according to [16], which also proves the legitimacy of this
Theorem. But due to discontinuity of the individual objective function in Section 3.3 and 3.4,
we will only prove Proposition 3.2 given the method in Section 3.5 in this section.
Theorem 3.3. [16] Suppose the strategy sets are nonempty compact subsets of ﬁnite dimen-
sional Euclidean space and the aggregator function H is diagonally transfer continuous.
Then the game has a Nash equilibrium if and only if H is diagonally transfer quasi-concave.
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Proof. The aggregator function is deﬁned in [16] as:
H(x,y) =
n
∑
i=1
fi(yi,x−i).
Hence, given the 3-bus system, our aggregator function H is:
H =π1p1− (a1p1+ 12b1p
2
1)+π2p2− (a2p2+
1
2
b2p22)+π3p3− (a3p3+
1
2
b3p23)+(π2−π1),
f1+(π3−π2) f2+(π3−π1) f3− c(F11 +F21 +F31 +F12 +F22 +F32 +F13 +F23 +F33 ).
While method in Section 3.5 has a two-level structure, in which LMPs, power outputs and
ﬂows are all parameters in the second level proﬁt maximisation. Hence, there are only 9
individual investment capacities left as decision variables in the aggregator function and
corresponding H becomes:
H =−c(F11 +F21 +F31 +F12 +F22 +F32 +F13 +F23 +F33 ).
The linearity of the above aggregator function makes it concave.
To sum up, the strategy sets of the game are nonempty compact according to Propo-
sition 3.2. Moreover, the aggregator function is continuous indicating beyond reasonable
doubt that the aggregator function is diagonally transfer continuous since the latter is a
weaker condition in contrast with continuity. Finally we proved that the aggregator function
is concave, which also implies that it is diagonally transfer quasi-concave. As a result, all
the conditions in Theorem 3.3 are satisﬁed. The 3-bus system has Nash equilibrium if the
method in Section 3.5 is employed.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, several methods with respect to solving transmission investment problems in
decentralised way are proposed due to the disadvantages of the current network planning
methods. Among which, the ﬁrst two in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 employ two assumptions to
simplify the problem: the ﬁrst is LMPs are considered being the marginal costs of local
generators, and the second is to assume ﬂow equals to the sum of capacities proposed
by individual players. For guaranteeing these two assumptions holding, a 2-bus system
is used for implementation. The iterative method in Section 3.2 could ensure obtaining
Nash equilibrium if results converging, while the analytical method in Section 3.1 does not
according to the deﬁnition of Nash. But above two methods obtain the same result, implying
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that the analytical method by solving ﬁrst order optimality conditions also produces the Nash
equilibrium in this 2-bus system. And their results indicate that cheap generator is keen to
invest for producing more power output such that its proﬁt will be raised. While the generator
in the expensive bus does not reveal investment intention as it could have kept monopolistic
position for serving local demand if no interconnection exists.
We then propose another three methods for decentralised transmission investment from
Section 3.3 to 3.5. They are more general than previous two as they get rid of the afore-
mentioned two assumptions and being implemented on a 3-bus mesh system. Due to the
different conﬁguration of these three methods, players may have distinct action sets and
objective functions; hence they obtain different results. But generally speaking, the cheap
generator shows more interest in investing than those at the expensive buses. Results are also
compared with centralised transmission planning capacity in Section 3.6 and it can be seen
that decentralised results are very close to centralised solutions.
Moreover, we proved the existence of Nash in Section 3.7 for several proposing methods.
Because Nash may not exist for some problems, being aware of whether or not Nash exists
would save lots of energy searching for Nash in a system that does not have any.
Chapter 4
Methods of using equilibrium constraints
for decentralised transmission
investment problem
In Chapter 3, several methods were put forward for solving the general transmission invest-
ment problem in decentralised way. However, each of them has its shortcomings.
The ﬁrst method described in Section 3.3 is that given a discrete action set, each player
chooses the capacity it would like to build and assume other players chose the same actions
as they did in the previous step. Then the centrally market clearing is proceeded and
corresponding proﬁt of the chosen action is calculated. After experimenting every action,
each player chooses the one that produces maximum proﬁt as the optimal for the current
iteration and the process stops until no one would change its strategy. But the drawback is
too time consuming to apply in the large system where more branches and more players are
involved.
The method in Section 3.4 is using Q-learning to choose the individual capacities for
network investment. A discrete action set is still needed but due to the record on previous
performances via Q-value, each player does not have to try every action at every iteration.
Computation time is short and convergence can be guaranteed, however, it produces random
results and is as a matter of fact inefﬁcient for assuming each player has no knowledge of
past moves.
Section 3.5 presents a two-level method, in which power schedules, ﬂows and nodal
prices are obtained in the ﬁrst level centrally market clearing while second level decentralised
proﬁt maximisation determines individual investment capacities. Disadvantage is power
schedules, ﬂows and nodal prices that used in the individual proﬁt function are obtained from
the ﬁrst level optimisation, they consequently cannot participate in the proﬁt maximisation at
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the second level as decision variables. As a result, only the proﬁt from the investment can be
taken into account.
Nevertheless, the nodal prices from aforementioned three methods are based on the real
power outputs obtained by centrally market clearing process. And ﬂows are not simpliﬁed to
equal the capacity of the line but be variables that related to the real time power scheduling.
These are the dominant advantages of those three methods comparing to methods in Sec-
tion 3.1 and 3.2. In this chapter, new methods will continue be proposed for decentralised
transmission investment to overcome the drawbacks of above three methods.
4.1 MPEC method
In order to maintain the advantages of methods from Section 3.3 to 3.5, LMPs must be
addressed based on centralised market clearing. However, they cannot be solved before
individual making investment decisions as method in Section 3.5 did since doing so will not
be capable of capturing the mutual effect that LMPs and individual investment capacities
have on each other at the same time. Thus another way for accurately formulating nodal
prices have to be ﬁgured out.
Inspired by [23, 27, 29, 37, 49–51, 63], we will model the behaviours of individual
players regarding transmission investment with Mathematical Program with Equilibrium
Constraints(MPEC in short) this section, in which, the centralised market clearing process is
transformed to corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that be included in the decen-
tralised proﬁt maximisation. Hence, the new game is different with the one in Section 3.5
since LMPs will be formulated and be able to participate in the individual proﬁt maximisation
as decision variables. The details of constructing a MPEC is discussed as follows.
4.1.1 MPEC Formulation
Suppose a system has n buses, G generators and NoBr branches, the process of centralised
market clearing is given in (4.1).
minΦ :=min
p
G
∑
i=1
(aipi+
1
2
bip2i ) (4.1a)
0≤ pi ≤ pmaxi ,∀i : β 0p ,β+p (4.1b)
G
∑
i=1
pi =
n
∑
j=1
d j : λ (4.1c)
−T ≤ f = GSF× (Mpp−d)≤ T : β−f ,β+f (4.1d)
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where β 0p , β+p , λ , β
−
f and β
+
f are Lagrangian multipliers for corresponding constraints.
And the dimension of these multipliers will depend on the dimension of the corresponding
constraints. Therefore, β 0p ∈ℜG×1, β+p ∈ℜG×1, λ ∈ℜ1, β−f ∈ℜNoBr×1 and β+f ∈ℜNoBr×1.
Since vector of ﬂows f could be transformed as function of power outputs, p ∈ℜG×1
will be the only variables in (4.1). Auxiliary matrix Mp ∈ℜn×G is to indicate the location of
generators, and Mp{ j,i} = 1 if there exists generator(s) on bus j. We rearrange (4.1) as
minΦ :=min
p
Ap+
1
2
pBp (4.2a)
s.t. Aieqp≤ bieq+MieqFi : β (4.2b)
Aeqp= beq : λ (4.2c)
where λ ∈ℜ1 and β :=
[
β−f
 β+f
 β 0p
 β+p

] ∈ℜ2(NoBr+G)×1.
Furthermore, A ∈ℜG×1 and B ∈ℜG×G are related to linear and quadratic cost coefﬁcients
of generators and
A := [a1 · · · aG], B :=
G⊕
i=1
bi = diag(b1, · · · ,bG) =
⎡
⎢⎣b1 . . . 0... . . . ...
0 . . . bG
⎤
⎥⎦ .
Aeq := 11×G, beq := ∑nj=1(d j) ∈ℜ1 are ancillary matrices for satisfying the equality power
balance constraint (4.1c). Aieq :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
−GSFMp
GSFMp
−IG
IG
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦∈ℜ2(NoBr+G)×G, where I denotes the identity
matrix, Mieq :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
INoBr
INoBr
0G,NoBr
0G,NoBr
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ∈ℜ2(NoBr+G)×NoBr, and bieq :=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
−GSF×d
GSF×d
0G×1
pmax
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ ∈ℜ2(NoBr+G)×1.
For constructing the Lagrangian function, the equality constraint (4.2c) with multiplier λ
and the inequality constraints (4.2b) with β are added into the objective function (4.2a) such
that:
minΦ¯ :=min
p
Ap+
1
2
pBp−λ(Aeqp−beq)+β(Aieqp−MieqFi−bieq). (4.3)
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Differentiating (4.3) over decision variables p and new introduced multipliers λ ,β will
produce the KKT conditions:
eq1= ∂ Φ¯∂ p = A+Bp−Aeqλ +Aieqβ = 0,
eq2= ∂ Φ¯∂λ = Aeqp−beq = 0,
eq3= β ∂ Φ¯∂β = β ◦ (Aieqp−MieqFi−bieq) = 0,
(4.4)
where symbol ◦ denotes the Schur or Hadamard product [7]. If matrices A ∈ℜn×m and B ∈
ℜn×m, (A◦B) ∈ℜn×m is the entry-wise product of two matrices A and B, such that
(A◦B){i, j} := A{i, j} ×B{i, j}.
According to [31], nodal prices are related to λ and β that are the corresponding multi-
pliers to the power balance and ﬂow constraints and also to the GSF that depicts how the
ﬂows would change with the different power injections. If the constraint is binding, e.g. the
total production has to equal the demand, the multiplier λ must be non-zero. And β would
be non-zero if the corresponding lines are congested or particular generator is dispatched to
its limits. The formula of computing the nodal prices for all buses are given as [1]:
π = λ +Mπβ , (4.5)
where Mπ = (M2×GSF)M1, and auxiliary matrices M1 and M2 are:
M1 :=
[
I2NoBr, 02NoBr×2G
]
, M2 :=
[
INoBr
−INoBr
]
.
Matrix M1 occurs to show that LMPs are only related to β−f and β
+
f .
Thus, nodal prices in the individual proﬁt function for calculating energy revenue and con-
gestion surpluses can be replaced with (4.5). And in the meantime, optimality conditions (4.4)
shall be included in each generator’s optimisation as equality constraints. Moreover, two
inequality constraints must be satisﬁed:
ieq1 = β ≥ 0,
ieqi,1 = Aieqp−MieqFi−bieq ≤ 0.
(4.6)
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The optimisation problem for generator i to maximise the sum of its production and invest-
ment proﬁt is accordingly as:
maxΩi :=max(Revi−OCi+CSi− ICi) (4.7a)
s.t. lb≤ Fi ≤ ub : μ iieq (4.7b)
eq1 = 0 : μ ieq1 (4.7c)
eq2 = 0 : μ ieq2 (4.7d)
eq3 = 0 : μ ieq3 (4.7e)
ieq1 ≥ 0, ieqi,1 ≤ 0 (4.7f)
In (4.7a),
Revi := π j pi =
[
MiMp (λ +Mπβ )
]
p,
where π j is LMP for bus j where generator i locates. Mi ∈ℜG is a square matrix thatM(i,i) = 1
and rest of entries are zeros. Operating cost of generator i is:
OCi := aipi+
1
2
bip2i = (MiA)
 p+
1
2
p (MiB) p,
For the congestion surplus, it is equal to:
CSi :=
NoBr
∑
k=1
(
πdk × fk×
Fki
Fki +F
k
i−+ ε
)
= 11,NoBr×
{(
Mdππ
)
◦ [GSF(Mpp−d)]◦Fi (Fi+Fi−+η)
}
,
(4.8)
πdk is the price difference between two buses that are connected by branch k, and η is a very
small positive number to prevent the denominator from being zero. Mdπ ∈ℜNoBr×n is a matrix
only contains ±1s and 0s such that
Mdππ :=M
d
π(λ +Mπβ ) =
[
πd1 · · · πdNoBr
]
,
Symbol denotes the Hadamard division[7]. If matrices A∈ℜn×m and B∈ℜn×m, (AB)∈
ℜn×m is the entry-wise division of two matrices A and B, such that
(AB){i, j} := A{i, j} ÷B{i, j}.
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Fig. 4.1 A MPEC from a bi-level problem
Investment cost ICi is given as
ICi := c
NoBr
∑
k=1
Fki = c×11,NoBr×Fi,
It can be seen that (4.7) is composed of two levels: the lower level is resulting from
centralised market clearing and upper level is individual proﬁt maximisation. Unlike the two-
level method in Section 3.5, (4.7) is professionally categorised as mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints(MPEC), which represents optimisation problem involving constraints
that represent equilibrium conditions [18]. Figure 4.1 illustrates the structure of a MPEC
problem.
Due to the non-convexity of MPEC, it is computationally very difﬁcult to solve, especially
one wishes to obtain the global optimum [35]. Therefore, some papers, such as [29, 43, 63],
linearise the problem and sacriﬁce accuracy for ﬁnding the global optimum. We, on the
contrary, choose to solve the original problem because of the cubic and inverse functions
involved in term CSi in (4.8), which is one of the main contributions for unprecedentedly
fair and accurate distributing the reward due to congestion among all participants based on
their own decisions. If linearising the term with general methods, such as the Taylor series,
enormous informations will be lost; consequently, we maintain the original problem for each
generator and obtain a local optimum of (4.7).
Since structure of (4.7) is so complicated, we choose IPOPT as the solver, which is an
interior-point based nonlinear solver that is widely used in large scale advanced control and
numerical optimization ﬁelds [61]. In order to apply IPOPT, all the decision variables in (4.7)
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have to be vectorised in xi, where xi := [p Fi λ β], and (4.7) can be transformed into
min
xi
f (xi) (4.9a)
s.t. clb ≤ h(xi)≤ cub (4.9b)
xlb ≤ xi ≤ xub (4.9c)
Speciﬁcally, the objective function (4.9a) and constraints (4.9b) are rewritten with respect to
xi:
f (xi) :=Alxi+
1
2
xi Aqxi+E1[(G1xi)◦ (G2xi)]+
E2[(G3xi)◦ (G4xi)◦ (G5xi) (Lxi+C)]+
E3[(G6xi)◦ (G7xi) (Lxi+C)], (4.10a)
h(xi) :=Axi+B12[(B1xi)◦ (B2xi)]+Ch, (4.10b)
where Al,Aq,E1,E2,E3,G1,G2,G3,G4,G5,G6,G7,L,C,A,B12,B1,B2,Ch,clb, cub, xlb and xub
are all sparse constant matrices.
IPOPT also requires Jacobian and Hessian(optional) matrices of nonlinear objective
function (4.10a) and constraints (4.10b), which are given in Appendix A.
In conclusion, every generator’s proﬁt maximisation problem for determining its invest-
ment capacity will be modeled as (4.9). Since there are totally G generators allowing to
invest in the transmission network, iterative method is applied to solve the multiple MPEC
problems. And at each iteration, individual generator obtains its investment decisions by
solving (4.9), given the decisions of the rest of the generators as determined in the previous
iteration. The problem will then proceed iteratively until no one could be better-off when
changing his strategy unilaterally, the Nash would be reached.
4.1.2 Determining ﬁnal expansion plan
The above MPEC formulation expresses the decision making problem of a single player in
the non-cooperative game of decentralised transmission planning. If generators’ respective
expansion plan could achieve unanimous consent, such a plan corresponds to a Nash equilib-
rium of this non-cooperative game. Given which, none of the generators can increase their
proﬁts by unilaterally modifying their decisions. However, as mentioned before, existence
and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium are not guaranteed. What is worse, iterative
method for solving multiple MPECs are not ensured to end up with a Nash even if Nash exist.
As a result, in the case of no agreement is reached, the regulator will need to determine the
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ﬁnal transmission expansion plan, reconciling the conﬂicting interests of the different entities.
Apart from the convergence difﬁculties, we also state above that local optimum rather than
global optimum will be obtained due to the non-convexity of MPEC problem.
As a result, we employ two measures in this section to address above challenges. First
of all, the iterative method is executed by attempting different initial points for the indi-
vidual expansion decision; this measure increases the probability of converging to a Nash
equilibrium if Nash exist. And it also offers the local equilibrium that close to the global
optimal. Secondly, a heuristic approach is adopted to determine the ﬁnal expansion plan
in case multiple or no Nash equilibrium are reached after trying out the whole set of initial
points. In the former case, the ﬁnal expansion plan corresponds to the Nash leading to the
minimum system cost among all reached equilibrium. In the latter case, the ﬁnal expansion
plan corresponds to the expansion decisions Frz leading to the minimum system cost across all
starting points z and iterations r. The rationale of this heuristic measure lies in our preference
of favouring socially efﬁcient expansion plans when the decentralised planning attempt
cannot produce a deﬁnite solution. The ﬂowchart for depicting the whole procedure of using
MPEC method to determine the expansion plan is given in Figure 4.2.
4.2 EPEC method
Instead of solving multiple MPECs iteratively, we could also obtain the corresponding KKTs
of every MPEC problem and combine them together for constituting a new structure called
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints(EPEC for short) [5, 25, 38, 46, 47] for the
decentralised transmission investment problem.
In (4.7), Lagrangian multipliers have already been distributed, where μ iieq ∈ℜ2NoBr×1 are
multipliers for the individual inequality constraints (4.7b) and μ ieq1 ∈ℜG×1,μ ieq2 ∈ℜ1,μ ieq3 ∈
ℜ2(NoBr+G)×1 are respective multipliers for equality constraints (4.7c),(4.7d) and (4.7e).
(4.7b) displays the lower and upper bounds on decision variable Fi, which can be rear-
ranged as matrix form:
AFiieq×Fi ≤ bFiieq : μ iieq, (4.11)
For constructing the Lagrangian function, we add equality constraints (4.7c), (4.7d) and (4.7e)
with corresponding multipliers μ ieq1, μ
i
eq2 and μ
i
eq3 respectively and also the inequality
constraint (4.11) with μ iieq into the objective function (4.7a). The optimization problem (4.7)
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ation company i
...MPEC of gener-
ation company 1
... MPEC of gener-
ation company n
Obtain Fr+1z
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Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Multiple NE Single NE No NE
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Fig. 4.2 Flowchart of determining ﬁnal expansion plan given MPEC method
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will then be transformed into:
minΩ¯i :=−min(Revi−OCi+CSi− ICi)
−μ ieq1

eq1−μ ieq2

eq2−μ ieq3

eq3+μ iieq
(
AFiieqFi−bFiieq
)
. (4.12)
The KKT conditions are derived by differentiating (4.12) over decision variables p, Fi
and multipliers λ ,β , μ iieq, μ
i
eq1, μ
i
eq2 and μ
i
eq3:
eq1 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂ μ ieq1
= A+Bp−Aeqλ +Aieqβ = 0, (4.13a)
eq2 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂ μ ieq2
= Aeqp−beq = 0, (4.13b)
eq3 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂ μ ieq3
= β ◦ (Aieqp−MieqFi−bieq)= 0, (4.13c)
eqi,1 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂ p
=−Mi
(
Mp (λ +Mπβ )−A
)
+(MiB) p−Bμ ieq1 −Aeqμ ieq2 −Aieq
(
β ◦μ ieq3
)
− (GSFMp)
{(
MdπMπβ
)
◦Fi (Fi+Fi−+η)
}
= 0, (4.14a)
eqi,2 = μ iieq ◦
∂ Ω¯i
∂ μ iieq
= μ iieq ◦
(
AFiieqFi−bFiieq
)
= 0, (4.14b)
eqi,3 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂Fi
=
{(
MdπMπβ
)
◦ (GSF(Mpp−d))◦Fi ((Fi+Fi−+η)◦ (Fi+Fi−+η))
}
−
{(
MdπMπβ
)
◦ (GSF(Mpp−d)) (Fi+Fi−+η)
}
+Mieq
(
β ◦μ ieq3
)
+(AFiieq)
μ iieq+ c= 0, (4.14c)
eqi,4 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂λ
=−11,nMpMip+Aeqμ ieq1 = 0, (4.14d)
eqi,5 =
∂ Ω¯i
∂β
=−Aieqμ ieq1 −
(
Aieqp−MieqFi−bieq
)◦μ ieq3 −Mπ MpMip
−
(
MdπMπ
){
(GSF(Mpp−d))◦Fi (Fi+Fi−+η)
}
= 0, (4.14e)
ieqi,2 = μ iieq ≥ 0, (4.14f)
ieqi,3 = A
Fi
ieqFi−bFiieq ≤ 0. (4.14g)
All the generators will produce (4.13a), (4.13b) and (4.13c) that are the same as cen-
tralised KKTs (4.4). Therefore, the whole equation set for EPEC is the centralised equa-
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tions eq1, eq2 and eq3 and the individual KKTs {eqi,1, eqi,2, eqi,3 eqi,4, eqi,5}Gi=1 plus the
inequality constraints {ieqi,1, ieqi,2, ieqi,3}Gi=1 and ieq1; given which, the EPEC can be
reorganised into following feasibility problem:
min
x
0
s.t. clb ≤ h(x)≤ cub (4.15a)
xlb ≤ x≤ xub (4.15b)
where
x :=
[
p F1 · · · FG λ β μ1eq1
 · · · μ1eq3
 μ1ieq
 · · · μGeq1
 · · · μGeq3
 μGieq
]
.
(4.15a) and (4.15b) represent all the constraints and decision variables are bounded, and ieq1, ieqi,2
and ieqi,3 can be fulﬁlled by (4.15b). Given the vectorised decision variables, the constraint
set h(x) can be rewritten as:
h(x) :=Ax+B12 [(B1x)◦ (B2x)]+
W
{
[(N1x)◦ (N2x)+(N3x)] (Dx+Cd)+
[(L1x)◦ (L2x)◦ (L3x)+(L4x)◦ (L3x)]
[(Dx+Cd)◦ (Dx+Cd)]
}
+C,
(4.16)
A, B12, B1, B2, W , N1, N2, N3, D, Cd , L1, L2, L3, L4, C, clb, cub, xlb and xub are all sparse
constant matrices. IPOPT is likewise applied to solve the EPEC problem and the required
information, such as Jacobian and Hessian of nonlinear constraints h(x), can be found in
Appendix A.
Noted that, the solutions for (4.15) may be inﬁnite. Hence, instead of solving a feasibility
problem, different objective functions could be chosen for favoring different goals that expect
to achieve, e.g. in order to be social efﬁcient for the decentralised results, the centralised goal
that minimise the total operating cost plus investment cost could act as the objective function.
Nevertheless, due to large number of nonlinear equality equations, it is also possible that no
solutions could be found; moreover, those equilibrium that satisfy the EPEC conditions are
just stationary points and are not necessarily Nash equilibrium [4]. Therefore, if choosing
EPEC method to solve the decentralised transmission investment, the obtained results have
to be veriﬁed by the MPEC method as the latter uses iterative manner for searching for
equilibrium. The case studies with regard to the methods proposed in this chapter are given
in detail in Chapter 5.
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4.3 Proof of Existence of Nash Equilibrium based on new
game
In Section 3.7, Nash existence has been proved based on methods in Section 3.2 and 3.5.
Nevertheless, for the new game that realised by MPEC method for using equilibrium con-
straints to formulate LMP, the proof is not as easy since primary variables and new introduced
Lagrangian multipliers are involved in complementarity constraints and way for dealing with
nonlinear equality constraints is a conundrum. Hence, given the new game using MPEC
method, we will only prove the Nash existence on 2-bus system shown in Figure 3.1. And
several assumptions are required.
Assumption 4.1. For the 2-bus system shown in Figure 3.1, if there is no transmission line
between two buses, the marginal cost of generator Borduria (aB+bBdB) is lower than the
marginal cost of generator Syldavia (aS+bSdS);
Assumption 4.2. For the 2-bus system shown in Figure 3.1, there exists a transmission
investment capacity T , such that LMPs at two buses are identical; the demand dS is greater
than investment capacity T ; the maximum power output of generator Borduria is set to be
large enough such that pmaxB > T +dB;
Lemma 4.1. Given the 2-bus system shown in Figure 3.1, if Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold,
the objective function Ωi is concave on Fi.
Proof. For each generator, the MPEC problem is modelled as (4.7) and the decision vari-
ables in the 2-bus system are: p ∈ ℜ2×1,Fi ∈ ℜ1,λ ∈ ℜ1,β ∈ ℜ6×1. The equality con-
straints (4.7c) ∈ℜ2×1, (4.7d) ∈ℜ1 and (4.7e) ∈ℜ6×1 have to be taken into account since
every equality constraint is an implicit function of a variable and will decrease the dimension
of the problem by one.
According to the linear equality constraint (4.7d)∈ℜ1, the power output pS will be ﬁrstly
eliminated by a function of pB:
pS = dB+dS− pB. (4.17)
While for the complementarity constraints (4.7e) ∈ ℜ6×1, they are the products of the
inequality constraints (4.1b) and (4.1d) with their corresponding multipliers, which demands
either the inequality constraint binding, or the corresponding multiplier equals to zero. For
this 2-bus system, the reference direction for the ﬂow is from Borduria to Syldavia; while
Assumption 4.1 ensures that generator Borduria is cheaper than Syldavia, which implies f > 0.
Therefore, f >=−T cannot be binding and β−f = 0.
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As for the generation limit, generator at Borduria is cheap so that pB cannot be zero; β 0p
for generator Borduria is consequently 0. And according to Assumption 4.2, dS > T ;
therefore, generator at Syldavia has to produce some output for serving local demand. Hence
pS > 0, β 0p for generator Syldavia is 0. Also for the upper bound, Assumption 4.2 implies
that p<= pmax will not bind and β+p = 0 for both generators. Hence the complementarity
constraint (4.7e) becomes
β+f ◦
⎡
⎣GSF(Mpp−d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
−T
⎤
⎦= 0,
Since there are one generator at each bus currently, n = G and ancillary matrix Mp can be
removed. And GSF=
[
0 −1
]
for any reactance used in the 2-bus system.
If let β+f = 0, f will equal to the capacity:
f = GSF(p−d) = FgB+FgS, (4.18)
and
β =
[
0 β+f 0 0 0 0
]
. (4.19)
Given (4.17) and (4.18), we get
pB = FgB+FgS+dB, pS = dS−FgB−FgS. (4.20)
Substituting (4.19) and (4.20) into (4.7c) gives
λ = aB+bBpB, β+f = aS+bSpS− (aB+bBpB). (4.21)
The LMPs can be obtained as:
π = λ +Mπβ =
[
aB+bBpB aS+bSpS
]
. (4.22)
Therefore, according to (3.16) in Section 3.7.1, both ΩgB and ΩgS are concave functions.
Alternatively, if β+f = 0, multipliers β will be:
β =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0
]
.
Thus there is no price difference between two buses, and pB and λ can be uniquely obtained
from (4.7c). pS will accordingly be determined based on (4.17). As a result, the only variable
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for generator Borduria after considering equality constraints is FgB. As for the objective
function after dimension reduction, only the term of linear investment cost will be left; hence
eigenvalue of Hessian matrix of ΦgB is 0, which indicates that ΩgB is concave on FgB given
β+f = 0. Similarly, for generator Syldavia, the objective function ΩgS is concave on FgS.
Proposition 4.1. For the 2-bus system introduced in Figure 3.1, if Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2
hold, FgB and FgS belong to a compact and convex set F, this 2-player non-cooperative game
on transmission line investment decisions has Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The best response function for Fi given Fi− is
Vi(Fi−) := {Fi|Ωi(Fi,Fi−) is maximized, for Fi ∈ F} .
Based on Lemma 4.1, if Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold, Ωi(Fi,Fi−) will be concave; while
the concavity of the objective function Ωi(Fi,Fi−) and the convexity of the set F guarantee
thatVi(Fi−) is either a point or a convex set [42]. Moreover, because Fi− ∈F, andVi(Fi−)∈F,
Fi− → Vi(Fi−) is consequently a mapping of set F onto itself. In addition, let us deﬁne a
limit point F0i for any sequence path Fi− → F0i−, then
F0i ∈
{
F0i | lim
Fi−→F0i−
Ωi(Fi,Fi−) is maximized, for F0i ∈ F
}
.
The continuity of Ωi(Fi,Fi−) ensures that
lim
Fi−→F0i−
Ωi(Fi,Fi−) =Ωi(Fi,F0i−),
which implies that F0i ∈Vi(F0i−). Because Vi(F0i−) is the image set of F0i−, Fi− →Vi(Fi−) is
an upper hemi-continuity mapping. Consequently, Nash equilibrium would exist for this
2-player non-cooperative game by Theorem 3.2.
However, for the large system, we may not know which of the inequality constraints is
binding; therefore, for each of the constraints, two cases are assessed: β = 0 or corresponding
inequality constraint binding. If there are y complementarity constraints, the total number of
possible situations will be 2y and Nash will only exist when the sufﬁcient existence conditions
hold for every situation.
As a consequence, the Nash existence proof based on MPEC method for large system
will be much more complicated than 2-bus system and may not succeed. But the essence
is that each equality constraint should eliminate one variable from the original objective
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function and those after reducing dimension are the ones to be checked whether Theorem 3.2
are satisﬁed.
4.4 Conclusions
Although there are several methods that already put forward in Chapter 3 for decentralised
transmission investment, they have respective shortcomings. For the methods in Section 3.1
and 3.2, they apply some assumptions that would not hold for most of the systems. While
the methods in Section 3.3 and 3.4 provide a discrete capacity set for players to choose
from. Thus individual investment capacities will not be continuous variables that obtained
by optimisation, but are discrete parameters. As for the method in Section 3.5, it does not
have the aforementioned disadvantages from previous methods; nevertheless, since LMPs
and individual investment capacities are obtained from two different optimisations, the proﬁt
from power production will no longer be unknown when maximising individual player’s
total proﬁt. This is the problem due to not modelling the effect that LMPs and individual
investment capacities cause to each other simultaneously.
Therefore, in order to tackle the above disadvantages, two new methods proposed in this
chapter derive the KKTs from centralised market clearing process for formulating LMPs. And
these KKTs are treated as extra equality constraints and placed under each generator’s proﬁt
maximisation problem. By doing so, LMPs and individual investment capacities are solved
in one optimisation; the new methods hereby are capable of capture mutual effect between
LMPs and decentralised investment capacities at the same time. In Section 4.1, decentralised
transmission investment problem is modelled as MPEC and each player simultaneously
obtain the best capacity to invest when assuming others’ choices are given. After some
iterations, the results are guaranteed to be Nash equilibrium if they converge. And we proved
the existence of Nash equilibrium based on this method in Section 4.3. While for the method
in Section 4.2, every player obtains corresponding KKTs from its MPEC, which will then be
combined and solved together. The aggregating KKTs constitute the EPEC structure. But the
results from solving EPEC are not necessarily Nash, but have to be veriﬁed using iterative
method.

Chapter 5
Case studies for MPEC and EPEC
method
Given methods proposed in Section 4.1 and 4.2, large number of sensitivity cases are
implemented from Section 5.1 to Section 5.3 on the 2-bus system shown in Figure 3.1
to assess how different parameters and different composition of participants affect the
decentralised transmission investment capacities. Parameters used in 2-bus system are the
same as Section 3.1 and 3.2. In addition, Section 5.5 investigates case studies based on
MPEC method on a 16-bus UK transmission system, in which, several situations including
whether involving ﬁx cost and whether having original transmission lines are taken into
account.
Apart from generators, demand suppliers and/or merchant entities who are not generators
nor suppliers are both participating in the proposing decentralised transmission investment
framework in this chapter. Speciﬁcally, when players are generators, the individual objective
function is shown in (4.7a). If demand suppliers are also allowed to participate in the
transmission investment, the objective function for supplier j will be:
minΩ j :=min
(
Payj+ ICj−CSj
)
,
where Payj is the demand supplier j’s payment for serving its demand. As for merchant
entities, they will only maximise the proﬁt from investment since they do not incur operating
cost/revenue from producing energy and payment from buying the energy. Hence, the
objective function for merchant k is as:
maxΩk :=max(CSk− ICk) ,
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Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
agS(£/MWh) 13 20 30
Table 5.1 Three different linear cost coefﬁcient for generator at Syldavia
For the MPEC method, the constraints irrespective of whether players are generators, demand
suppliers or merchant entities are always (4.7b) to (4.7f). As for the EPEC method, different
kind of players will have slightly different equations comparing to (4.14).
5.1 Assessing the effect that generating cost coefﬁcients have
on the individual investment capacities
Intuitively, we suppose the cheap generator and the demand supplier at the expensive bus
are the only units that have incentive to invest in the network since the expensive generator
would lose proﬁt from power production if interconnection exists. Similarly, for the demand
supplier locating at the cheaper bus, investing on the interconnection would raise the price
of its local bus since the generator at the same bus is more than happy to produce more for
serving other demand.
In this section, we will choose three different linear cost coefﬁcient for generator at
Syldavia, which is shown in Table 5.1, to examine behaviours of different participants based
on different coefﬁcients so as to check whether the instinct above is correct.
5.1.1 Two generators
Suppose only two generators are involved in decentralised investment, the capacities given
MPEC method for case 1 is as:
Case1 : F∗gB = 580MW, F
∗
gS = 0MW. (5.1)
(5.1) is the Nash equilibrium since MPEC method will solve the multiple optimisation prob-
lems in iterative manner, which conforms to the requirement of reaching Nash equilibrium.
While for EPEC method, it is equivalent to solving enormous equations. Hence, we could
either solve the feasibility problem(solving equations without objective function), or assign
an objective function. In our case, however, in order to be consistent with MPEC method, we
will choose not to designate an extra objective function. Moreover, different initial searching
points may lead to different local optimum for the nonlinear problem; as a result, several
initial searching points are used when applying EPEC method and two different solutions are
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obtained:
1st : F∗gB = 580MW, F∗gS = 0MW,
2nd : F∗gB = 0MW, F∗gS = 0MW.
(5.2)
Both two groups of results in (5.2) are the solutions of solving (4.15), however, the ﬁrst
group is the Nash equilibrium that is the same as it obtained from MPEC. While the second
one is not because it cannot stay unchanged in iterative process. This veriﬁes that for solving
EPEC, the solution obtained are not always Nash. In the following case studies, we will
only display the equilibrium from EPEC method that already passed the veriﬁcation for the
purpose of clarity.
Given other two linear cost coefﬁcients for generator at Syldavia, Nash obtained from
both MPEC and EPEC methods are as:
Case2 : F∗gB = 720MW, F∗gS = 0MW,
Case3 : F∗gB = 900MW, F∗gS = 50MW.
(5.3)
In case 1, the linear cost for generator at Syldavia is £13/MWh and with this value, the
generator at Borduria invests 580MW for its maximum proﬁt while generator at Syldavia
invests 0MW. This result coincides with those in Section 3.1 and 3.2. While for case 2,
agS increases to £20/MWh, which makes the price difference between two buses higher.
Hence, the generator at Borduria is entitled a more advantageous place for serving demand
at Syldavia and it accordingly increases investment capacity to 720MW. But the generator
at Syldavia still does not invest. As for the case 3, the price difference between two buses
is further increased given the linear cost is £30/MWh. (5.3) shows that not only cheap
generator invests 900MW, the expensive generator also invests 50MW. We could deduce that
pro f itinvestment that collected by the expensive generator by investing 50MW is more than
the adverse effect it has on production proﬁt under this circumstance.
Because the results from case 3 is violating our instinct, Table 5.2 reveals speciﬁcally
how revenue, operating cost, congestion surplus, investment costs etc. vary for the expensive
generator when it chooses other amount to invest, in which, ΩpgS,Ω
inv
gS denote proﬁt from
production and investment, respectively and ΩgS is the total proﬁt received by generator
Syldavia. It is clear that the production proﬁt decreases when generator at Syldavia begins to
invest in the interconnection. For example, it reduces from £3600 in the case of no-investment
to £3025 when investing 50MW. On the other side, it collects £625 by investing 50MW,
which is the differential between congestion surplus and investment cost. And this income
from investment can totally offset the loss in production proﬁt, therefore, the expensive
generator chooses to invest 50MW for its maximum proﬁt.
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FgS πB πS pB pS Rev OC Ω
p
gS CS IC Ω
inv
gS ΩgS
0 24 42 1400 600 25200 21600 3600 0 0 0 3600
20 24.2 41.6 1420 580 24128 20764 3364 348 80 268 3632
50 24.5 41 1450 550 22550 19525 3025 825 200 625 3650
80 24.8 40.4 1480 520 21008 18304 2704 1248 320 928 3632
100 25 40 1500 500 20000 17500 2500 1500 400 1100 3600
Table 5.2 Deciding values for generator at Syldavia for different FgS given F∗gB = 900MW
In summary, the expensive generator will sometimes also be encouraged to invest for
the sake of the investment proﬁt according to (5.3). But it should be noted that the cheap
generator has more incentive than the competitor, hence, the former will invest no less than
the latter.
5.1.2 Two demand suppliers
If only two demand suppliers are taking part in the decentralised transmission investment,
the procured capacities given two methods are in (5.4).
Case1 : F∗dB = 0MW, F
∗
dS = 900MW.
Case2 : F∗dB = 0MW, F
∗
dS = 1017MW.
Case3 : F∗dB = 11MW, F
∗
dS = 1177MW.
(5.4)
In case 1, demand supplier connected at the Syldavia invests 900MW on the intercon-
nection because existence of transmission line could allow cheap power from Borduria to
transport to Syldavia, which will reduce the payment that the supplier has to pay for serving
its load and also collect income from investment. Similarly, when the linear cost coefﬁcient
increases in case 2 and case 3, the price at the Syldavia will become more and more expen-
sive. Hence, the supplier connecting at the same bus increases its investment capacities to
1017MW and 1177MW. Moreover, the demand supplier at the cheap bus begins to invest in
case 3, which is worth investigating to justify this decision. Table 5.3 explains how payment,
congestion surplus and investment cost change in case 3 when demand supplier at the Bor-
duria invests different amount to the line. ΩpdB,Ω
inv
dB denote payment for serving demand and
proﬁt from investment, respectively and ΩdB is the total payment for demand Borduria. It
can be seen that demand supplier at Borduria should invest 11MW given FdS = 1177MW to
have the least total payment, because although investment would increase the payment from
energy perspective, but it could provide more surplus from investment. Consequently, it can
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FdB πB πS Ω
p
dB CS IC Ω
inv
dB ΩdB
0 26.77 36.46 13385 0 0 0 13385
10 26.87 36.26 13435 93.9 40 53.9 13381.1
11 26.88 36.24 13440 103 44 58.96 13381.04
20 26.97 36.06 13485 181.8 80 101.8 13383.2
50 27.27 35.46 13635 409.5 200 209.5 13425.5
Table 5.3 Deciding values for demand supplier at Borduria for different FdB given F∗dS =
1177MW
only be concluded that the demand supplier at the expensive bus has more interest in network
investment than the counterparty, as a result, the former will invest no less than the latter.
5.1.3 Two merchants
The participants for network investment can be neither generators nor demand suppliers,
hence merchant entities would only maximise the proﬁt from investment to obtain the optimal
capacity to invest. The capacities for two methods given 3 cases are presented in (5.5).
Case1 : F∗M1 = 267MW, F
∗
M2 = 267MW.
Case2 : F∗M1 = 344MW, F
∗
M2 = 344MW.
Case3 : F∗M1 = 456MW, F
∗
M2 = 456MW.
(5.5)
It can be seen that both merchants’ investment capacities are gradually increasing from
case 1 to 3. This is due to more congestion surplus they could obtain caused by the higher
price difference from increased linear cost coefﬁcient of generator at Syldavia.
5.1.4 Two generators and two demand suppliers
In this section, four participants including two generators and two demand suppliers are
all participating, whose objectives are maximising proﬁt and minimising total payment
respectively. Given three different cost coefﬁcients, the capacities for two methods are
displayed in (5.6):
Case1 : F∗gB = 345MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 588MW
Case2 : F∗gB = 422MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 745MW
Case3 : F∗gB = 558MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 904MW
(5.6)
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From (5.6), only cheap generator and demand supplier at the expensive bus invest in
the interconnection among all three cases. It is due to the rational characteristic players
possess. No matter what coefﬁcients applied, the sum of all participants’ actions would
not exceed an maximum capacity that makes no price difference between two buses. Also
because their actions are interdependent, if one player shows more interest and submits a
large amount of investment capacity, the margin left for others will be reducing. Therefore,
given 4 participants, the cheap generator and the demand supplier at the expensive bus both
have more incentive to invest comparing to other two, and the sum of their capacity is already
equal or near the maximum capacity. Thus the demand supplier at the cheap bus and the
expensive generator have little margin left for beneﬁt and accordingly choose not to invest.
In addition, the cheap generator and the demand supplier at the expensive bus increase
their investment capacities from case 1 to case 3 since the price difference between two buses
is enlarging, which will bring more surplus to them from both energy and investment aspect.
5.1.5 Six participants
Apartment from two generators and two demands, two merchants also join for the investment
in network and results are given in (5.7).
Case1 : F∗gB = 345MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 588MW,F
∗
M1 = 0MW,F
∗
M2 = 0MW
Case2 : F∗gB = 422MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 745MW,F
∗
M1 = 0MW,F
∗
M2 = 0MW
Case3 : F∗gB = 558MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 904MW,F
∗
M1 = 0MW,F
∗
M2 = 0MW
(5.7)
It can be seen that the individual decision on the capacity for the interconnection given
6 participants is similar to (5.6), which is the cheap generator and the demand supplier at
the expensive bus invest while all other participants do not. This result can be explained by
comparing different participants’ objectives:
Generator :maxProﬁt= Proﬁtproduction+Proﬁtinvestment,
Demand supplier :minPayment= Paymentproduction−Proﬁtinvestment,
Merchant entity : maxProﬁtinvestment.
Given the parameters used in Section 5.1, for the cheap generator, both Proﬁtproduction and
Proﬁtinvestment will increase by investing in the network. Hence, investment behaviour is
furthest encouraged. Similarly, the demand supplier at the expensive bus also eagers to
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agS = 13 agS = 20 agS = 30
Centralised results Total capacity(MW) 800 1033 1367
Decentralised results
2 gencos 580 720 950
2 demands 900 1017 1188
2 merchants 534 688 912
4 players 933 1167 1462
6 players 933 1167 1462
Centralised results Total cost(£) 38650 42733 45733
Decentralised results
2 gencos 39376 44206 48338
2 demands 38800 42737 46212
2 merchants 39711 44522 48834
4 players 38915 43001 45870
6 players 38915 43001 45870
Table 5.4 Comparison in total investment capacity and total cost with centralised results
invest since its Paymentproduction will reduce while Proﬁtinvestment increases given incremental
investment capacity, which are both favorable when minimising its total payment. As a result,
these two are the ones that have high-motive ranking for the transmission investment.
The merchant entities, however, only have the investment proﬁt to be collected. Therefore,
they have less interest in investment comparing to aforementioned two and could consequently
be categorised as entities with medium-motive.
As for the expensive generator, investing on network would reduce Proﬁtproduction, but
increase Proﬁtinvestment. Therefore, it is conﬂicting when making investment decisions and
it will not invest until the income from the investment could exceed the loss in production
proﬁt. The same situation arises for the demand supplier at the cheap bus as investment will
incur higher energy payment for itself but supply reimbursement from the investment aspect.
Hence these two entities are the low-motive ones and whether investing entirely depends on
real situations.
Based on the conclusion drew above, it is therefore reasonable that only the high-motive
entities invest when entities with different rankings are all involved as this section does.
5.1.6 Conclusions
In Section 5.1, given different participants involved, we evaluated how decentralised capac-
ities change with different linear cost coefﬁcients for generator at Syldavia based on two
methods in Chapter 4. And it can be seen that both methods obtain the same results provided
that EPEC’s solutions are Nash equilibrium.
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Centralised results Total cost 38650 42733 45733
Decentralised results
2 gencos 1.88% 3.45% 5.70%
2 demands 0.39% 0.01% 1.05%
2 merchants 2.75% 4.19% 6.78%
4 players 0.69% 0.63% 0.30%
6 players 0.69% 0.63% 0.30%
Table 5.5 Percentage difference in terms of total cost with centralised results
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Linear investment cost c(£/MWh) 15 25 35
Table 5.6 Three different linear investment cost coefﬁcient
Next we will compare the sum of investment capacity from individual decisions as well
as the total cost with centralised results in Table 5.4, and the %difference in total cost is given
in Table 5.5.
These two tables indicate that increasing price difference will procure more investment
capacities. Furthermore, the total cost given decentralised capacities are not far from cen-
tralised solutions for all the cases. Among which, the case involving only merchants is
the one deviating from centralised results the most since merchant companies will only
be motivated to invest in capacity by the congestion revenue. For generators or demand
suppliers, however, they are driven to invest not only by congestion surplus but also by the
improvements of their energy proﬁt and payment, respectively. Finally, it is concluded from
the case studies in this section that increasing number of different kind of players will not
always make results more social efﬁcient.
5.2 Assessing the effect that linear investment cost have on
the individual investment capacities
In this section, we will evaluate the effect different linear investment cost brings to the
individual investment decisions for both MPEC and EPEC methods. Three cases shown
in Table 5.6 are implemented. The linear cost coefﬁcients for two generators are: agB =
10£/MWh,agS = 13£/MWh, and other parameters remain the same.
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FgB πB πS pB pS Rev OC Ω
p
gB CS IC Ω
inv
gB ΩgB
0 15 43 500 1500 7500 6250 1250 0 0 0 1250
20 15.2 42.6 520 1480 7904 6552 1352 548 700 -152 1200
40 15.4 42.2 540 1460 8316 6858 1458 1072 1400 -328 1130
60 15.6 41.8 560 1440 8736 7168 1568 1572 2100 -528 1040
100 16 41 600 1400 9600 7800 1800 2500 3500 -1000 800
Table 5.7 Deciding values for generator at Borduria for different FgB given F∗gS = 0MW
5.2.1 Two generators
Suppose two generators are involved, their investment capacities are given in (5.8):
Case1 : F∗gB = 360MW, F∗gS = 0MW,
Case2 : F∗gB = 160MW, F∗gS = 0MW,
Case3 : F∗gB = 0MW, F∗gS = 0MW.
(5.8)
Results show that when investment cost increases, generator at Borduria reduces its
capacity because the income it can receive from investment is shrinking. It even invests
0MW when c = 35£/MWh. The price difference without interconnection is only £28,
any investment cost larger than £28 will cause participants losing money in investment
perspective. But the proﬁt from power production will increase for the cheap generator when
FgB > 0. Therefore, it is hard to tell what is the best for generator at Borduria. Table 5.7
displays deciding factors given different investment capacity for generator at Borduria in
case 3. It can be seen from the table that investment proﬁt reduces faster than energy proﬁt
increases, as a result, the cheap generator has to choose not to invest in order for receiving
the maximum total proﬁt.
5.2.2 Two demand suppliers
Suppose two demand suppliers are participating, results are displayed in (5.9). It is interesting
that in case 3, demand supplier at Syldavia still invests 383MW even it will gain negative
investment proﬁt. The detailed values for explanation is shown in Table 5.8.
Case1 : F∗dB = 0MW, F
∗
dS = 717MW,
Case2 : F∗dB = 0MW, F
∗
dS = 550MW,
Case3 : F∗dB = 0MW, F
∗
dS = 383MW.
(5.9)
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FdS πB πS Ω
p
dS CS IC Ω
inv
dS ΩdS
0 15 43 64500 0 0 0 64500
100 16 41 61500 2500 3500 -1000 62500
300 18 37 55500 5700 10500 -4800 60300
383 18.83 35.34 53010 6323 13405 -7082 60091.67
400 19 35 52500 6400 14000 -7600 60100
Table 5.8 Deciding values for demand supplier at Syldavia for different FdS given F∗dB = 0MW
Table 5.8 indicates that payment incurred by demand supplier at Syldavia is reducing
when increasing FdS, which is favorable for itself; but ΩinvdS is continuously losing money
because of the extremely high investment cost. Therefore, in order for having the minimum
payment, demand supplier at Syldavia will invest 383MW in the interconnection.
5.2.3 Two merchants
If participants are two merchant entities, the capacities given three different investment costs
are laid out in (5.10).
Case1 : F∗M1 = 144MW, F
∗
M2 = 144MW,
Case2 : F∗M1 = 33MW, F
∗
M2 = 33MW,
Case3 : F∗M1 = 0MW, F
∗
M2 = 0MW.
(5.10)
It can be seen that individual investment capacities are reducing with the increasing of the
investment cost. Moreover, two merchant entities do not invest in case 3 when c= 35£/MWh
because they only collect proﬁt from investment and when investment cost already higher
than the price difference given no interconnection, investing in network will deﬁnitely lose
money. Therefore, they both decide not to invest in the network in case 3.
5.2.4 Two generators and two demand suppliers
Two generators and two demand suppliers are making investment decisions, and results are
given in (5.11). It can be seen from case 2 and 3 that except for demand supplier at Syldavia,
others are all investing 0MW. But in case 2, generator at Borduria did invest in Section 5.2.1,
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FgB πB πS pB pS Rev OC Ω
p
gB CS IC Ω
inv
gB ΩgB
0 20.5 32 1050 950 21525 16013 5512 0 0 0 5512
20 20.7 31.6 1070 930 22149 16425 5724 218 500 -282 5442
40 20.9 31.2 1090 910 22781 16841 5940 412 1000 -588 5352
60 21.1 30.8 1110 890 23421 17261 6160 582 1500 -918 5242
100 21.5 30 1150 850 24725 18113 6612 850 2500 -1650 4962
Table 5.9 Deciding values for generator at Borduria for different FgB given F∗dS = 550MW
however, it shows no interest in this section.
Case1 : F∗gB = 92MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 671MW,
Case2 : F∗gB = 0MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 550MW,
Case3 : F∗gB = 0MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 383MW.
(5.11)
It is because in Section 5.2.1, others are not investing, which makes investing 160MW
as the best choice for generator at Borduria. But now demand supplier at Syldavia invests
550MW, cheap generator consequently decides not to invest for the maximum proﬁt. This
decision can be justiﬁed by Table 5.9. This situation demonstrates again that individuals’
actions are interdependent and each participant is seeking the best response when considering
others’ choices.
5.2.5 Six participants
This section will consider two generators, two demand suppliers and two merchant entities.
The results are shown in (5.12), and it is clear that similar results are obtained as Section 5.2.4.
The reason is that only high-motive entities ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest due to the high linear
investment cost. And in case 2 and 3, even the cheap generator will give up investment let
alone those from lower motive rankings.
Case1 : F∗gB = 92MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 671MW,F
∗
M1 = 0MW,F
∗
M2 = 0MW,
Case2 : F∗gB = 0MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 550MW,F
∗
M1 = 0MW,F
∗
M2 = 0MW,
Case3 : F∗gB = 0MW,F∗dB = 0MW,F
∗
gS = 0MW,F
∗
dS = 383MW,F
∗
M1 = 0MW,F
∗
M2 = 0MW.
(5.12)
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c= 15 c= 25 c= 35
Centralised results Total capacity(MW) 433 100 0
Decentralised results
2 gencos 360 160 0
2 demands 717 550 383
2 merchants 288 66 0
4 players 763 550 383
6 players 763 550 383
Centralised results Total cost(£) 45433 48100 48250
Decentralised results
2 gencos 45514 48154 48250
2 demands 46640 51138 53131
2 merchants 45750 48117 48250
4 players 47064 51138 53131
6 players 47064 51138 53131
Table 5.10 Comparison in total capacity and total cost with centralised results
Centralised results Total cost 45433 48100 48250
Decentralised results
2 gencos 0.18% 0.11% 0%
2 demands 2.66% 6.31% 10.12%
2 merchants 0.70% 0.04% 0%
4 players 3.59% 6.31% 10.12%
6 players 3.59% 6.31% 10.12%
Table 5.11 Percentage difference in terms of total cost with centralised results
5.2.6 Conclusions
Similar to Section 5.1, both MPEC and EPEC methods are used to assess how decentralised
results vary with different linear investment cost for different composition of participants.
And two methods generate the same Nash equilibrium.
The sum of individual investment capacities and the total cost is compared with cen-
tralised results in Table 5.10 and 5.11. These two tables manifest that increasing number
of participants would not necessarily make the decentralised results more social efﬁcient.
In addition, case with only merchants involved is not always the one producing the furthest
result from centralised planning because the decentralised results are related to every pa-
rameter applied and it is extremely hard to predict what each player would choose for its
own interest. But what can be deduced is that increasing investment cost will reduce the
transmission investment capacity.
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5.3 Assessing the effect that different number of identical
participants have
According to [45], increasing number of participating players will prompt the game more
competitive, which accordingly reduce the market power exercised by individual players.
Section 5.1 and 5.2 however, demonstrate that more players with different kinds will not
always push decentralised results close to capacity from centralised paradigm. Therefore,
we will try to vary the number of identical players this section to reveal whether the total
capacity will get close to the centralised optimal.
In order to obtain the decentralised capacities given large number of players, MPEC
method will not be applied directly because it solves the problem iteratively and will conse-
quently be extremely hard to obtain the agreed decisions among vast of players. Likewise,
EPEC is also inapplicable due to its difﬁculties in programming and ﬁnding solutions once
and for all. As a result, we will assume:
1. LMPs are marginal costs of local generators
2. power ﬂow equals to capacity
and solve the KKTs together from the simpliﬁed decentralised problem. But the solutions
obtained cannot guarantee to be Nash equilibrium, MPEC method is therefore indispensable
for making sure verifying the status of the solutions with the original problem.
In light of the above two assumptions, all decision variables in each player’s objective
function could be transformed as functions of individual investment capacities. And two
constraints are included for ensuring non-negativity of investment capacities and validity of
the above assumptions. First constraint is to let Fi ≥ 0, where Fi is the investment capacities
by player i. In addition, ∑Fi ≤ FΔπ=0, where FΔπ=0 is the capacity resulting in no price
difference. If ∑Fi > FΔπ=0, ﬂow will not equal to the investment capacity, which accordingly
violate the second assumptions.
5.3.1 Increasing number of generators
When there are two generators, each of which connecting at one bus, the optimal individual
capacity is:
F∗gB = 580MW, F
∗
gS = 0MW.
Suppose splitting the original generator at each bus to different number of identical sub-
generators but keeping the aggregated supply functions unchanged, the decentralised capacity
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given different number of sub-generators at each bus is sketched in Figure 5.1. It can be seen
from the ﬁgure that the centralised capacity representing by red line is 800MW and it will
not change with the increasing number of identical sub-generators. Blue curve, denoting
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Fig. 5.1 Total investment capacities given increasing number of sub-generators
the decentralised capacity, is getting close to centralised capacity and when there are 400
sub-generators at each bus, investment capacity under decentralised and centralised structure
approximately equal.
5.3.2 Increasing number of demand suppliers
If one demand supplier connects at each bus, the optimal individual capacity is:
F∗dB = 0MW, F
∗
dS = 900MW.
Assuming there are different number of identical sub-demands at each bus while the total
demand for each bus is still the same as before, corresponding decentralised capacity is
depicted in Figure 5.2.
It can be seen that centralised capacity is 800MW no matter how many sub-demands exist.
The decentralised capacity, on the other hand is approaching the red line with the increasing
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Fig. 5.2 Total investment capacities given increasing number of sub-demands
number of identical sub-demands. Moreover, when there are 400 identical sub-demands at
each bus, the sum of decentralised capacity reaches nearly 800MW.
5.3.3 Increasing number of merchant entities
In this section, impact that how sum of decentralised capacity change with increasing
number of identical merchants is evaluated and illustrated in Figure 5.3. Similar to previous
sections, the centralised capacity representing by red line is always 800MW; while the blue
curve, which shows decentralised capacities, is approaching the red line with the increasing
number of merchants. And when there are 800 merchants competing to invest in the system,
decentralised results reach centralised planning capacity.
5.3.4 Increasing number of generators and demand suppliers
Previously, only identical players are participating in the decentralised transmission in-
vestment. Now, we assume both generators and demand suppliers are making investment
decisions and the original generator and demand supplier at each bus is split to different
number of identical sub-players. Figure 5.4 shows how total capacities will change, and
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Fig. 5.3 Total investment capacities given increasing number of sub-merchants
similarly, decentralised capacity is approaching the red line and eventually results under two
different paradigms are equal.
5.3.5 Conclusions
Among all the proposing methods, MPEC and EPEC are the most general ways in decen-
tralised transmission investment because they formulate price accurately with equilibrium
constraints, which equally makes these two methods the most difﬁcult ones to solve. More-
over, MPEC method has convergence trouble for large number of players; EPEC method, on
the other hand solves all players’ variables together, which is also not easy to ﬁnd the feasible
solutions that happen to be Nash especially when having numerous players. As a result, we
used the simpliﬁed analytical way ﬁrst to solve this section’s decentralised problem and take
MPEC method as a supplementary veriﬁcation tool for ensuring that obtained solutions are
Nash equilibrium.
Based on the results from Section 5.3, it can be seen that when increasing number of
identical players, such as generators, demand suppliers or merchant entities, the decentralised
result is getting close and eventually equal to centralised optimal; under which circumstance,
decisions by players pursuing for their own maximum beneﬁts are consistent with the capacity
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chosen by central entity to make the system most efﬁcient. The reason is deduced that when
having increasing number of participants, the effect of their respective investment decisions
on LMPs is shrinking until become negligible. At this time, all participants are price-takers
and the market is consequently competitive.
5.4 Summary
From Section 5.1 to 5.3, we evaluated the inﬂuence of different coefﬁcients and different
participating players cause to the individual investment capacities. Case studies in Section 5.1
demonstrated that the higher the price difference is, the more investment capacity would be
procured. The conclusion drew from Section 5.2 was the higher the investment cost is, the less
the investment capacity would be. As for Section 5.3, results showed that increasing number
of identical players could push the decentralised investment capacity close to centralised
solution .
Furthermore, it is known that participants’ objectives are composed of several factors that
may have contradictory effects in investment decisions. Therefore it is hard to predict who
will be the ones having interest in investment and what capacity is the best for themselves.
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But due to the motivation ranking of participants, e.g.
high motive : cheap generator, demand supplier at the expensive bus
medium motive : merchant entities
low motive : expensive generator, demand supplier at the cheap bus
the cheap generator and demand supplier at the expensive bus are more inclined to invest. For
the participants at the lower ranking, the situation will be complex and we have no knowledge
to foresee their choices. But there will be a basic principle that reasonable results have to
conform to, which is:
Capacityhigh motive ≥ Capacitymedium motive ≥ Capacitylow motive
5.5 Case study for 16-bus system
Previously, we use a 2-bus system for modeling decentralised transmission investment. In
this section, a 16-bus system shown in Figure 5.5 is applied to obtain individual capacities.
As discussed before, EPEC method will not directly provide Nash equilibrium but have to use
iterative process to verify the solutions obtained. Also we have demonstrated in Section 5.1
and 5.2 that as long as the solution EPEC method ﬁnds is Nash, it will obtain the same
equilibrium with MPEC. Thus we will only apply MPEC method for this large system.
In this system, n is 16 and NoBr is 15. Number of generating units G is 14 because
there are one generator at each of the bus except for bus 10 and 13. We will group the 14
generating units to two companies because only a few companies will exist in real power
system and decisions they make are based on the total proﬁt for the company. Power company
1 possesses generating units in the north which are units at bus 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7. Other units
are owned by company 2.
The capacities and cost coefﬁcients of generators are given in Table 5.12 [22]. The
upper bound for individual investments is 12000MW, which means each company could at
most invest 12000MW on each of the transmission line. The reactances for 15 branches are
assumed as 1Ω and the corresponding GSF are shown in Appendix B.
Suppose the time horizon is 1 year, the load [22] displayed in Table 5.13 shows that they
are divided into a peak and an off-peak demand level, where the duration for two levels are
respectively 3401 and 5359 hours. We also sketch the demand in Figure 5.6 to understand
its distribution and the difference between two levels more directly. It can be seen that in
peak period, the demand is around two times than the off-peak time in most of the buses.
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Bus Capacity(MW) ai(£/MWh) bi(£/MWh2)
1 1866 46 0.06002
2 1210 48 0.08595
3 612 27 0.05229
4 602 37 0.07960
5 2950 69 0.05356
6 5936 12 0.02392
7 3601 33 0.02833
8 10359 57 0.01989
9 22327 51 0.00564
10 0 0 0
11 15247 52 0.01613
12 5822 25 0.0824
13 0 0 0
14 2606 33 0.07285
15 12947 61 0.01869
16 12442 129 0.03086
Table 5.12 Cost coefﬁcients of generators for 16-bus system
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
peak(MWh) 405 444 0 481 1133 2200 2330 6124
off-peak(MWh) 243 267 0 289 680 1321 1400 3679
Bus 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
peak(MWh) 5256 0 9677 4821 0 2231 1629 12038
off-peak(MWh) 3157 0 5813 2896 0 1340 978 7231
Table 5.13 Demands for 16-bus system given two levels
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Fig. 5.5 16-bus system
And for both levels, the majority of the demand is located in the south of the 16-bus system,
especially at the southernmost bus.
The objective function for each generating company is to maximise the proﬁt it could
receive for the whole year, which consists of proﬁt from power production and the income
via transmission investment that is obtained by subtracting the annual investment cost from
the congestion surplus. For the annual cost of building a transmission line, we assume in this
section that it is the sum of a variable cost that proportional to the capacity intended to build,
and a ﬁx cost, which is a one-off cost for building the transmission lines [31]:
CT (F) =CF +CV (F).
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In previous sections, ﬁx investment cost is neglected regardless of its importance. But in the
following case studies, CF is chosen as 50000£/(km· year) and it is clear that the value of the
ﬁx cost does not depend on how much each company builds on the line. And the variable
cost is a linear function of the investment capacity:
CV (F) = z× l×F,
where z= 50£/(MW· km· year). As a result, suppose players are generators, its full formula-
tion for total proﬁt becomes:
maxΩi :=max
(
Revi−OCi+CSi− ICi− ICiﬁx
)
, (5.13)
where ICiﬁx = ICﬁx× FiFi+F−i . Similarly, for the demand supplier j and merchant entity k, their
respective objective function when considering ﬁx cost is:
minΩ j :=min
(
Payj+ ICj+ IC
j
ﬁx−CSj
)
, (5.14)
maxΩk :=max
(
CSk− ICk− ICkﬁx
)
. (5.15)
The length for each of the branch in the 16-bus system and the corresponding annual variable
and ﬁxed investment cost are given in Table 5.14.
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Fig. 5.6 Demand for each of the bus for different levels
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Branch Length(km) Variable investment cost(£/MW ) Fix investment cost(£)
1 100 5000 5000000
2 100 5000 5000000
3 36 1800 1800000
4 120 6000 6000000
5 35 1750 1750000
6 150 7500 7500000
7 150 7500 7500000
8 67 3350 3350000
9 30 1500 1500000
10 93 4650 4650000
11 75 3750 3750000
12 45 2250 2250000
13 155 7750 7750000
14 195 9750 9750000
15 60 3000 3000000
Table 5.14 Length and investment costs for branches in 16-bus system
5.5.1 Way for facilitating convergence for the iterative method
Because the problem will be solved in a decentralised way, each company obtains optimal
investment capacities by maximising its own proﬁt whilst assuming others’ decisions are ﬁxed.
This iterative way, as discussed previously, does not guarantee ﬁnding Nash equilibrium. The
difﬁculties of convergence will further exacerbate in the large system.
In order to facilitate players reaching agreements on their personal wishes for the 16-
bus system, we will relax the accuracy of individual investment capacities gained by each
player at each iteration. Speciﬁcally, the obtained individual optimal capacity will be a
decimal number, which may not meet the technical speciﬁcations in real network investment.
Therefore, it will be trimmed to the nearest integer that is a multiple of ten. For instance,
the optimisation decides that player 1 should invest 293.1452MW on a certain line at some
iteration, then the player crops this investment amount to 290MW and submit subsequently
this new value to the central entity for further iterative process. In doing so, participants are
all making effort for the convergence since they give themselves a 10MW ﬂexible range,
within which, they assume their decisions are the same. Consequently, decentralised results
would converge easier than before.
Under the circumstances that the individual results after undertaking the aforementioned
measure are still not converged, i.e. jumping among several solutions, we could use little
interference from central entity according to Section 4.1.2 to assign the objective function
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Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Connecting buses Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 1 Gen 2
1 1—2 740 40 640 40
2 2—4 1260 0 1080 0
3 3—4 610 0 610 0
4 4—5 1990 0 1820 0
5 5—6 2240 0 2070 0
6 6—7 5500 0 5370 0
7 7—10 6770 0 6640 0
8 8—10 1810 0 1510 0
9 9—10 0 3050 0 2800
10 10—13 8010 0 7930 0
11 11—13 2020 210 1960 430
12 12—13 310 2610 280 2640
13 13—16 3670 3100 4360 2170
14 14—16 0 0 0 370
15 15—16 0 0 0 0
Table 5.15 Expansion decisions for two generating companies given two situations
of centralised transmission planning, which is the primary goal the central entity intends
to achieve, to pick the most social efﬁcient solution out. After all, not reaching the full
consensus for participants is common in real world.
5.5.2 Implementations given no lines existing yet
In this section, we will assume no lines existing in the 16-bus system and each company
makes investment decisions on each of the candidate branches given two different demand
levels to pursue the maximum proﬁt for the whole year. Furthermore, two different situations
are assessed: in situation 1, each company only considers variable investment cost when
choosing the optimal capacity to invest in the network; as for situation 2, they will also take
ﬁx investment cost into account.
Two generating companies
Suppose two generating companies are taking part in decentralised transmission investment
and company 1 occupies generating units from bus 1 to bus 7 while company 2 owns the
units from rest of the buses. The results of individual investment decisions are shown in
Table 5.15.
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We will analyse results of situation 1 ﬁrst. As can be seen, company 1’s units are relatively
cheap and located in the north, however, demands shown in Table 5.13 are mainly in the
south. Consequently company 1 invests throughout this radial system so as to export its
cheap power to the places where demands locate, especially on branch 6,7 and 10 since these
three lines are in the key position to facilitate company 1 to serve competitor’s demand.
The company 2 on the contrary, has relatively expensive units and much higher demand.
Therefore, the company does not invest too much for keeping its monopolistic position.
Nevertheless, the bus 16 has the extremely expensive unit and the highest demand; hence
letting unit 16 serving its local demand seems not economical. As a result, the company
invests on several branches in the south so that it could use its own cheaper units to help
serving the demand at bus 16. And for the branch in company 1’s territory, company 2 invests
a little to collect congestion surplus without impairing its proﬁt from power production
perspective.
The results are similar for situation 2 when taking ﬁx cost into account. Company 1 still
invests on almost every line in order to transport cheaper power down to competitor’s area.
And company 2 refuses to invest on lines linking south to north, but invests on several lines
to make its own cheap units serve the highest demand at bus 16.
In addition, both companies invest slightly less in situation 2 because it has to consider
the extra ﬁx cost when building the lines. But the difference between two situations is small
since the ﬁx cost for the investment is trivial comparing to yearly power revenue, operating
costs, congestion surplus etc.
Two demand companies
If two demand companies invest in the network, their corresponding capacities are given in
Table 5.16, where demand company 1 is responsible for serving loads from bus 1 to 7 while
others are in charge of demand company 2.
Table 5.16 shows that for both situations, demand company 2 inclines to invest in the
whole network since it has high demand, however locates at the area with relatively expensive
generating units. By investing that much, it could serve all its demands with cheaper source
from the north. The demand company 1, however, does not intend to rise its area’s price
up, therefore invests very little. But for some branches in the south, company 1 proposes
some capacities for the sake of investment proﬁt. And similar to previous section, investment
capacities in both situations are similar since ﬁx cost is too small comparing to yearly energy
payment.
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Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Connecting buses Demand 1 Demand 2 Demand 1 Demand 2
1 1—2 0 980 0 980
2 2—4 0 1480 0 1480
3 3—4 30 580 0 610
4 4—5 0 2210 0 2210
5 5—6 0 2210 0 2210
6 6—7 0 4910 0 4910
7 7—10 0 5990 0 5980
8 8—10 0 2180 0 2180
9 9—10 810 7820 760 7870
10 10—13 440 12000 430 12000
11 11—13 40 4360 10 4380
12 12—13 100 2820 0 2920
13 13—16 700 8330 680 8350
14 14—16 70 480 60 490
15 15—16 0 2700 0 2700
Table 5.16 Expansion decisions for two demand companies given two situations
Two merchant companies
If participants are two merchant companies, they do not produce power output or serve
demand. But the objective is to collect the maximum proﬁt from the difference between the
congestion surplus and investment cost. Expansion decisions of two merchant companies are
demonstrated in Table 5.17 and it can be seen that unlike the 2-bus system, they will invest
with different capacities. But their decisions are interdependent, which is reﬂected in the way
that each merchant company will accordingly change its strategy given what competitor’s
choice.
And because there are no lines initially in the system, two companies both invest on
almost every line with large capacity and under situation 2, both companies invest a little bit
less than that in situation 1 due to the ﬁx investment cost.
Two generating companies and two demand companies
If two generating companies and two demand companies are all participating, generating
company 1 and demand company 2 express more motivation to invest according to Table 5.18,
especially the latter that locates in the expensive area whilst having so much demand to serve.
For other two companies, the demand company 1 invests a lot on branch 13 due to the high
price difference of this line resulted from the most expensive unit and the highest demand at
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Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Connecting buses Merchant 1 Merchant 2 Merchant 1 Merchant 2
1 1—2 270 250 240 260
2 2—4 320 420 330 380
3 3—4 590 20 610 0
4 4—5 1040 430 1010 430
5 5—6 800 310 940 140
6 6—7 1770 1200 1640 1280
7 7—10 2090 1260 1960 1360
8 8—10 660 710 710 650
9 9—10 2380 2780 2830 2340
10 10—13 3720 3420 3470 3650
11 11—13 1230 1300 1300 1220
12 12—13 540 2380 1530 1390
13 13—16 2760 2850 2860 2740
14 14—16 0 0 0 0
15 15—16 470 410 400 480
Table 5.17 Expansion decisions for two merchant companies given two situations
Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Gen 1 Gen 2 Dem 1 Dem 2 Gen 1 Gen 2 Dem 1 Dem 2
1 0 0 0 970 0 0 0 970
2 0 0 0 1510 0 0 0 1510
3 0 0 0 610 0 0 0 610
4 0 0 0 2240 0 0 0 2240
5 0 0 0 2340 0 0 0 2340
6 0 0 0 5280 0 0 0 5280
7 0 0 0 6550 0 0 0 6550
8 1450 280 730 0 1470 270 650 0
9 0 0 0 7640 0 0 0 7640
10 0 0 0 12000 0 0 0 12000
11 2440 30 1550 0 2450 0 1540 0
12 0 0 0 2920 0 0 0 2920
13 3910 1120 3010 1130 3870 1140 3280 890
14 0 0 0 640 0 320 0 350
15 0 0 0 2940 0 0 0 2950
Table 5.18 Expansion decisions for four companies given two situations
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bus 16. As for generating company 2 with relatively expensive units, it also mainly invests
on branch 13 to use its own cheaper units to supply the highest demand at bus 16.
Analysis for the case studies given no lines existing yet
The pattern that cheap generating and expensive demand company invests more comparing
to other two is consistent with the conclusion obtained from 2-bus system. Nevertheless,
each company has to consider one year time horizon with two different demand levels for
this large system. Moreover, the cost functions of generating units are quadratic and the
difference of cost functions between two companies are not that obvious. Hence we could
only say that generating company 1 is relatively cheap since it contains several units and not
every one is cheaper than the units in generating company 2. Consequently, the decentralised
results will be very difﬁcult to predict and analyse.
Also previously, we could rank participants clearly according to their investment moti-
vation; however, for the 16-bus system, it is likely that companies are at different ranks of
motivation on different lines based on locations and cost functions of its generating units and
locations of demands. Let us take Table 5.15 as an example, intuitively, cheap generating
company will have higher motivation to invest. It is true on most of the lines except on
branch 9 and 12. Company 1 invests much less on these two lines in contrast with what
company 2 does because the latter is eager to use its own cheaper units at bus 9 and 12 to
serve the high demand in its area. Hence company 2 shows more interest than company 1 on
some speciﬁc lines.
In conclusion, due to the complexity of the system, results are diverse. But generally,
the cheap generating company and the expensive demand company will procure more
capacity comparing to other two. And what is new for the 16-bus decentralised results is
companies will invest on the branches in its own area. In doing so, they could let their
cheaper units serve demands connecting at the expensive buses. Also due to the radial system,
higher-motivation companies have to invest on some branches within its area to reach the
competitors’. Moreover, the geographic position of the generating units and the demands
also inﬂuence the individual investment capacities to a great extent.
Comparison with centralised results
In the above case studies, transmission investment capacities are decided by individual
players for maximising its own proﬁt. Next, we will solve the problem in centralised way
by minimising the sum of the cost from power production and transmission investment.
Results under two paradigms are compared in Table 5.19. Situation 1 and 2 represents cases
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without/with ﬁx investment cost. And comparing to huge yearly operating cost, investment
cost is so small that centralised capacities are similar for these two situations. The last row is
the distance in percentage with respect to the total cost.
It can be seen that increasing number of different participants fails to make decentralised
results more social efﬁcient. This is in accordance with the conclusion we obtained in
Section 5.1 and 5.2. And decentralised results given some proposition of players are not very
close to centralised planning in this large system.
5.5.3 Implementations given lines existing
In this section, we will assume initially there have been transmission lines built in the 16-bus
system whose capacities are displayed in Table 5.20 [58]. Companies consequently need to
expand on the existing network. Similar to Sections 5.5.2, two situations regarding whether
involving ﬁx cost are modeled respectively.
Two generating companies
When two generating companies participate in expanding the network, individual capacities
without/with ﬁx cost are compared in Table 5.21. Because the ﬁx cost for expansion is trivial
comparing to yearly operating cost, two companies make similar choices in two situations.
In contrast with Table 5.15, Table 5.21 shows that both companies do not invest on from
branch 11 to 15. This is because the initial capacities for these lines are already too high to
beneﬁt from building more MWs. As for the expansion on other lines, two companies follow
the similar principles they apply in Section 5.5.2. Speciﬁcally, company 1 invests more on
almost every branch so as to export its cheap power to the places where high demands locate.
It especially invests large amount on branch 6, 7 and 10 since these branches are the gateways
to the demand down the south. However, company 2 prefers not to help the competitor’s
cheap units to come into its territory so that it barely invest considering that lines are already
built in the network.
Two demand companies
For two demand companies, results are shown in Table 5.22. It can be seen that company
2 invests with much higher capacity on almost every branch to enable cheaper units from
company 1 to serve its demand at the south. But meanwhile, it shows no intention on branches
11 to 15 due to enough existing capacity.
For the company 1, it has lower motivation since investing lines will facilitate the cheaper
units at the same area producing more to serve the demand outside such that the energy price
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Situation 1
Branch Centralised 2 gens 2 demands 2 merchants 4 companies
1 913 780 980 520 970
2 1384 1260 1480 740 1510
3 612 610 610 610 610
4 2117 1990 2210 1470 2240
5 2120 2240 2210 1110 2340
6 4868 5500 4910 2970 5280
7 6052 6770 5990 3350 6550
8 2165 1810 2180 1370 2460
9 9517 3050 8630 5160 7640
10 13404 8010 12440 7140 12000
11 4393 2230 4400 2530 4020
12 2926 2920 2920 2920 2920
13 10012 6770 9030 5610 9170
14 745 0 550 0 640
15 2466 0 2700 880 2940
Total cost (×1010£) 2.4460 2.6827 2.4493 2.6763 2.4522
% 9.68 0.14 9.42 0.25
Situation 2
Branch Centralised 2 gens 2 demands 2 merchants 4 companies
1 913 680 980 500 970
2 1384 1080 1480 710 1510
3 612 610 610 610 610
4 2117 1820 2210 1440 2240
5 2120 2070 2210 1080 2340
6 4868 5370 4910 2920 5280
7 6052 6640 5980 3320 6550
8 2165 1510 2180 1360 2390
9 9517 2800 8630 5170 7640
10 13404 7930 12430 7120 12000
11 4393 2390 4390 2520 3990
12 2926 2920 2920 2920 2920
13 10012 6530 9030 5600 9180
14 745 370 550 0 670
15 2466 0 2700 880 2950
Total cost (×1010£) 2.4531 2.7012 2.4564 2.6839 2.4592
Percentage(%) 10.11 0.13 9.41 0.25
Table 5.19 Investment capacities under centralisased and decentralised paradigms
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Branch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Initial cap(MW) 400 1620 220 1520 2550 2200 3060 1661
Branch 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Initial cap(MW) 5761 10603 5974 3957 11551 5174 6423
Table 5.20 Initial capacities for branches in 16-bus system
Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Connecting buses Genco 1 Genco 2 Genco 1 Genco 2
1 1—2 660 0 660 0
2 2—4 0 0 0 0
3 3—4 370 20 360 30
4 4—5 830 0 830 0
5 5—6 0 0 0 0
6 6—7 3170 0 3170 0
7 7—10 3560 0 3560 0
8 8—10 560 0 560 0
9 9—10 0 3780 0 3780
10 10—13 3340 0 3340 0
11 11—13 0 0 0 0
12 12—13 0 0 0 0
13 13—16 0 0 0 0
14 14—16 0 0 0 0
15 15—16 0 0 0 0
Table 5.21 Expansion decisions for two generating companies given two situations
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Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Connecting buses Demand 1 Demand 2 Demand 1 Demand 2
1 1—2 0 660 0 660
2 2—4 0 10 0 10
3 3—4 210 180 390 0
4 4—5 0 840 0 840
5 5—6 0 0 0 0
6 6—7 0 3170 0 3170
7 7—10 0 3570 0 3570
8 8—10 0 560 0 560
9 9—10 0 3780 0 3780
10 10—13 0 3350 0 3350
11 11—13 0 0 0 0
12 12—13 0 0 0 0
13 13—16 0 0 0 0
14 14—16 0 0 0 0
15 15—16 0 0 0 0
Table 5.22 Expansion decisions for two demand companies given two situations
will be risen. But since there is no demand at bus 3, investing on branch 3 that makes unit
at bus 3 serve demand at bus 4 will only reduce the payment for the company rather than
increase it.
Two merchants
Given players are two merchant companies, the ﬁx cost will have a slightly obvious effect
on their respective expansion decisions since they only receive proﬁt from investment and
no yearly operating cost or payment involves. This conclusion is conﬁrmed by results in
Table 5.23, which shows that expansion decisions given ﬁx cost is clearly less than that of
situation 1. Also due to the interdependency between individual decisions, if one company
invests a large capacity on particular line that makes the price differential small, the other
party will choose a small amount; and vice versa. What is consistent is that no investment
occurs on branch 11 to 15.
Two generating companies and two demand companies
If two generating companies and two demand companies all intend to expand the network,
their decisions are not easy to reach complete agreement. But using the theory we propose in
Section 5.5.1, one solution is picked out and displayed in Table 5.24.
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Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Connecting buses Merchant 1 Merchant 2 Merchant 1 Merchant 2
1 1—2 180 180 140 150
2 2—4 0 0 0 0
3 3—4 390 0 200 190
4 4—5 120 270 130 180
5 5—6 0 0 0 0
6 6—7 1140 820 900 930
7 7—10 1240 940 1010 1030
8 8—10 60 20 60 0
9 9—10 1190 1320 1280 1260
10 10—13 640 680 680 560
11 11—13 0 0 0 0
12 12—13 0 0 0 0
13 13—16 0 0 0 0
14 14—16 0 0 0 0
15 15—16 0 0 0 0
Table 5.23 Expansion decisions for two merchant companies given two situations
Due to the huge yearly operating cost and payment, investment capacities under two
situations are barely noticeable. Moreover, generating company with relatively cheap units
and demand company locating at the area of expensive units reveal more interest in investing
than other two and these two high motivation entities end up with interdependent decisions.
For example, generating company 1 invests 390MW on branch 3 while demand company 2
does not invest in situation 1. In situation 2, on the contrary, demand company 2 chooses
390MW, which makes generating company 1 no margin left to beneﬁt so that it decides not
to contribute on this branch.
Comparison with centralised results
Table 5.25 compares centralised planning solutions with decentralised investment capacities
given different involving participants. And situation 1 and 2 represents cases without/with
ﬁx investment cost. It can be seen that increasing number of different participants does not
help to push decentralised capacities close to centralised planning. But the distance between
centralised and decentralised decisions is very close in terms of total cost.
In addition, given the initial existence capacity, beneﬁt margin left from investment is
largely reduced. Therefore, both centralised and decentralised structure invest much less than
what they did in Section 5.5.2 and even show no interest at all in branch 11 to 15. Moreover,
comparing to yearly operating cost and/or yearly payment, the ﬁx investment cost is so small
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Situation 1 Situation 2
Branch Gen 1 Gen 2 Dem 1 Dem 2 Gen 1 Gen 2 Dem 1 Dem 2
1 660 0 0 0 630 0 0 30
2 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
3 390 0 0 0 0 0 0 390
4 840 0 0 0 840 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 3080 0 0 90 2800 0 0 370
7 3570 0 0 0 2440 0 0 1120
8 150 0 0 410 560 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 3780 0 0 0 3790
10 1230 0 0 2120 1090 0 0 2250
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.24 Expansion decisions for four companies given two situations
that cases involving generating and demand companies make similar decisions regardless of
the participation of ﬁx cost.
Nevertheless, large system is much more complicated than 2-bus and players may have
different motivation levels depending on their and counterparts’ position. Hence the geo-
graphic effect of every player cannot be ignored when analysing decentralised results in large
system. But generally generating companies with cheap units and demand company at the
expensive area have more incentive in the transmission investment and every player’s action
will always be affected by others.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, Section 5.1 to Section 5.4 showcase large number of sensitivity case studies
using two methods from Chapter 4 on the 2-bus system. These case studies offer a compre-
hensive insight of how each player’s investment capacities would change given different cost
coefﬁcients of generators, different investment cost for building the lines, or different number
of players. Also apart from generators, demand suppliers and/or merchant companies are
also allowed in this chapter to participate in making investment decisions based on their
best interests. Performances of different kind of players’ simultaneous participation are
accordingly evaluated.
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Situation 1
Branch Centralised 2 gens 2 demands 2 merchants 4 companies
1 554 660 660 360 660
2 0 0 10 0 10
3 392 390 390 390 390
4 665 830 840 390 840
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 2772 3170 3170 1960 3170
7 3111 3560 3570 2180 3570
8 482 560 560 80 560
9 3833 3780 3780 2510 3780
10 3019 3340 3350 1320 3350
11 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0
Total cost (×1010£) 2.4219 2.4224 2.4224 2.4291 2.4224
% 0.021 0.022 0.2984 0.022
Situation 2
Branch Centralised 2 gens 2 demands 2 merchants 4 companies
1 554 660 660 290 660
2 0 0 10 0 10
3 392 390 390 390 390
4 665 830 840 310 840
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 2772 3170 3170 1830 3170
7 3111 3560 3570 2040 3560
8 482 560 560 60 560
9 3833 3780 3780 2540 3790
10 3019 3340 3350 1240 3340
11 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0
Total cost (×1010£) 2.4256 2.4261 2.4267 2.4337 2.4267
Percentage(%) 0.0222 0.0438 0.3352 0.0433
Table 5.25 Investment capacities given centralisased and decentralised optimisation
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It is concluded from above case studies that players will have distinguishable motivation
rankings for investment according to their type, location and characteristics. Entities in higher
motivation ranking, e.g. generator locates at the bus with lower LMP, generally invest no
less than those in lower rankings. But regardless of what rankings they belong to, increasing
investment cost for the network would weaken the investment desire; while on the contrary
enlarging price difference between two buses stimulate players to invest. Moreover increasing
number of identical players would make decentralised capacity approach centralised result.
From all the aforementioned case studies from Section 5.1 to Section 5.4, we reckon
method in Section 4.1 is advanced than it in Section 4.2 due to easiness of programming and
ﬁnding equilibrium solutions. As a result, in Section 5.5, only the former method is employed
in the UK 16-bus system. The implementation in large system unprecedentedly takes ﬁx
investment cost into account. Furthermore, situation of network with initial existing capacities
is also being investigated. And results indicate that the ﬁx cost and the initial capacities in
the network would both reduce individual investment capacities, albeit to different extents.
Decentralised results are also compared with centralised decisions and performances are
assessed based on the difference in terms of total cost between two paradigms.
We do not use the 3-bus system that used in Chapter 3 in this chapter due to the fact that
Nash do not exist sometimes. Given the same parameters used in the 3-bus system before,
methods in Chapter 4 do not procure any converging results. Hence, we cannot compare the
performances between methods in Chapter 4 and those in Chapter 3. However, both methods
in Chapter 4 are considered better than previous ones as they rid several assumptions that
may not always right and are able to treat investment capacities as continuous variables for
capturing the simultaneous effect with LMPs.

Chapter 6
Using decentralised method to decide the
cost allocation for transmission
expansion
As mentioned in Chapter 1, deregulation of the electricity industry has been observed
worldwide during the last two decades, involving the unbundling of vertically integrated
monopoly utilities, the introduction of competition in the generation and supply sectors,
and the open access to the electricity networks. From our understanding, the best ideal
way for interpreting deregulation is to eventually make the whole system operate in fully
decentralised order. There are bundles of works that have already been done with respect to
decentralised generation/demand side participation, but not too many in network investment
perspective. Hence, the decentralised, market-driven transmission planning by self-interested
entities is considered as a further step towards the liberalisation of the electricity industry.
However, taking into account the realistic circumstances, the completely decentralised
manner in transmission expansion planning needs tremendous changes in legalisation, market
rules etc.. As a result, as an intermediate step towards fully deregulation, we propose to
employ centralised way for obtaining the optimal plan for investing in network; but apply
the decentralised capacities from our proposing methods to allocate the resulted investment
cost. In order for achieving the above objective, investment capacity from decentralised
method must equal to centralised decisions; under which circumstance, corresponding cost
is recovered by all participants according to the share they are happy with. Since we have
demonstrated in Section 5.3 that decentralised and centralised transmission investment
capacity will equal given the 2-bus system when large number of players involved, we will
then investigate in the same system whether there are other conditions that have to be satisﬁed
to make decentralised capacities reach centralised solutions. Once the capacities under two
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paradigms equal, the allocation can be determined. There is another method [24] complying
with beneﬁciaries-pay principle in cost allocation that is being widely acknowledged at
present. Therefore, the allocation from our method will be compared with the one in [24] for
evaluating their performances.
6.1 Conditions that make results under centralised and de-
centralised paradigm equal
In the previous case studies of the 2-bus system in Chapter 5, ﬁxed investment cost that is not
proportional to howmuch capacity to be built has not been included in the individual objective
function. But we will involve the ﬁx cost in this section to explore whether decentralised
capacities will still equal to centralised results given large number of players.
6.1.1 Centralised way given the ﬁx cost
With the existence of the ﬁx cost, objective function for centralised optimisation will be as:
minOC(F)+ IC(F)+ ICf ixU(U), (6.1)
where U is introduced as a binary variable to indicate investment or not. Given the 2-
bus system shown in Figure 3.1 and parameters in Section 3.1, the optimal transmission
investment capacity is still 800MW provided ICf ix is no larger than £9600.
The reason is explained as below. When there is no interconnection, the sum of operating
cost and variable investment cost is £48250. While previous case studies indicate that
800MW will provide the minimum (OC+ IC) which is £38650. Thus if ICf ix is larger than
9600,
OC+ IC+ ICf ix = 38650+ ICf ix > 38650+9600= 48250,
the system operator will rather not to invest. On the contrary, provided that ICf ix is any value
smaller than 9600, 800MW will be the optimal capacity since as least it makes (OC+ IC)
minimum. This can be seen that although the ﬁx cost is included by a binary variable in the
centralised objective function, it generally fails to affect the value of the optimal investment
capacity due to the independence between the ﬁx cost term and others.
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6.1.2 Decentralised way given the ﬁx cost
Apart from centralised manner, decentralised paradigm could alternatively be used. Suppose
players are generators, the full formulation for each of the generator is given in (5.13).
Let ICf ix = £3200 and the blue line in Figure 6.1 illustrates how decentralised capacity
would vary with increasing number of identical generators. It can be seen from the ﬁgure
that decentralised capacity is getting close to the centralised solution denoting by the red line,
but will converge to a value lower than 800MW.
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
Number of generators
To
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t c
ap
ac
ity
(M
W
)
Decentralised capacity
Centralised capacity
Fig. 6.1 Total investment capacities given increasing number of sub-generators when involv-
ing ﬁx cost
We will elaborately explain the reason in this section. Suppose generators are the
participating players, it is shown in Section 5.3 that sum of decentralised capacity will
converge to the centralised solution with large number of identical sub-generators. Therefore,
decentralised proﬁt maximisation
max
Fi
Revi−OCi+CSi− ICi (6.2)
will produce Fi such that ∑i Fi is the same as it from centralised market clearing process
min
F
OC(F)+ IC(F) (6.3)
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Now both variable and ﬁx investment are considered and centralised optimisation
min
F,U
OC(F)+ IC(F)+ ICf ixU(U) (6.4)
still generates the same F as (6.3) since OC(F) + IC(F) and ICf ixU(U) are irrelative.
Hence, (6.4) is equivalent to:
min
F
OC(F)+ IC(F)+min
U
ICf ixU(U), (6.5)
subject to system constraints. Decentralised objective function with both cost however is:
max
Fi
Revi−OCi+CSi− ICi− ICiﬁx (6.6)
Comparing (6.6) with (6.2), an extra term indicating how much each player has to pay for
the ﬁx cost is presented in bold. And this term is a function of investment capacity Fi in the
way that
ICif ix(F) = ICf ix×
Fi
Fi+Fi−
.
Hence, it will inﬂuence the value of obtained investment capacities. Decentralised capacity
therefore cannot reach the centralised solution but end up with a lower value due to this extra
positive term ICif ix that each player incurs.
6.1.3 Conditions for making results under two paradigm equal
It is demonstrated in Section 6.1.2 that decentralised manner in essence will not accrue the
same capacity with the centralised structure when involving ﬁx cost. Therefore, in order
to ensure that results under decentralised and centralised paradigms equal, there are two
assumptions have to be obeyed:
1. large number of players must be involved;
2. ﬁx investment cost cannot be taken into account.
By virtue of above assumptions, we will have the most efﬁcient investment capacity from
system standpoint, and in the meantime allow individual players to pay the proportionate
investment cost based on their own interests.
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6.2 Allocation comparison given different methods
At ﬁrst, we will introduce the beneﬁciaries-pay method(BP method for short) that is widely
accepted nowadays for cost allocation. In the case of no interconnection, the corresponding
proﬁts and payments for 2 generators and 2 demand suppliers are:
ProﬁtgB = RevenuegB−OCgB = 1250£/h, (6.7a)
ProﬁtgS = revenuegS−OCgS = 22500£/h, (6.7b)
PaymentdB = 7500£/h, (6.7c)
PaymentdS = 64500£/h. (6.7d)
While the optimal expansion capacity is decided by centralised optimisation, which in this
case, is 800MW. Hence, the new proﬁts and payments become:
ProﬁtgB = RevenuegB−OCgB = 8450£/h, (6.8a)
ProﬁtgS = revenuegS−OCgS = 4900£/h, (6.8b)
PaymentdB = 11500£/h, (6.8c)
PaymentdS = 40500£/h. (6.8d)
It is clear that only generator at Borduria and demand supplier at Syldavia receive extra beneﬁt
due to new investment capacity in the network. Hence, if 4 players are all participating in the
cost allocation, the generator at Borduria and demand at Syldavia will be the ones accounting
for the investment cost. And their respective allocation will base on the incremental beneﬁt
they obtain before/after investment:
allocgB =
(8450−1250)
(8450−1250)+(64500−40500) = 23.08% (6.9)
allocdS =
(64500−40500)
(8450−1250)+(64500−40500) = 76.92% (6.10)
It is noted that given BP method, the above allocation will not change when we split the
original player to large number of identical sub-players. Moreover, in the case that only
generators or only demand suppliers are involved, the generator at Borduria and the demand
at Syldavia will be 100% responsible for the cost, respectively.
Table 6.1 compares the cost allocation for different participating players given BP and
our decentralised MPEC method.
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Allocation(%)
Method Gen at Borduria Gen at Syldavia Demand at Borduria Demand at Syldavia
MPEC 100 0
BP 100 0
MPEC 0 100
BP 0 100
MPEC 14.79 0 0 85.21
BP 23.08 0 0 76.92
Table 6.1 Allocation regarding investment cost given different involving participants
It can be seen from Table 6.1 that when players are only generators or demand suppliers,
decentralised MPEC method and beneﬁciaries-pay method produce the same allocation,
where the high motivated entities are responsible for the investment cost since they are the
only beneﬁciaries. But when 4 players are all involving in the transmission expansion activity,
two methods would offer different allocations. However, it is hard to tell which allocation is
better as of now.
Nevertheless, only proﬁt from energy perspective is considered for the beneﬁciaries-pay
method when calculating incremental beneﬁt. Therefore, the beneﬁciaries can only be the
generator in the low LMP area and the demand supplier at the high LMP area. Nevertheless,
MPEC method also takes congestion surplus from transmission investment as another source
of income, and it has been demonstrated in Section 5.1 that the generator at the expensive area
and the demand supplier at the cheap area would also be driven to invest sometimes. Hence,
we will increase the linear cost coefﬁcient for generator at Syldavia to 30£/MW . And for the
beneﬁciaries-pay method, the proﬁts and payments before investing in the interconnection is:
ProﬁtgB = RevenuegB−OCgB = 1250£/h, (6.11a)
ProﬁtgS = revenuegS−OCgS = 22500£/h, (6.11b)
PaymentdB = 7500£/h, (6.11c)
PaymentdS = 90000£/h. (6.11d)
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Allocation(%)
Method Gen at Borduria Gen at Syldavia Demand at Borduria Demand at Syldavia
MPEC 76.08 23.92
BP 100 0
MPEC 7.28 92.72
BP 0 100
MPEC 36.19 0 0 63.81
BP 28.29 0 0 71.71
Table 6.2 Allocation regarding investment cost given different involving participants for
agS = 30£/MW
While given the new cost coefﬁcient, the centralised capacity is 1366.7MW. Hence the new
proﬁts and payments for 4 players after carrying out centralised capacity are:
ProﬁtgB = RevenuegB−OCgB = 17423£/h, (6.12a)
ProﬁtgS = revenuegS−OCgS = 178£/h, (6.12b)
PaymentdB = 14334£/h, (6.12c)
PaymentdS = 48999£/h. (6.12d)
As expected, only generator at Borduria and demand supplier at Syldavia would beneﬁt due
to the new investment capacity in the network. Therefore, if only generators or demand
suppliers are involving, the allocation will be the same as Table 6.1. However, in the case of
4 players all participating, allocation for the two beneﬁciaries is:
allocgB =
(17423−1250)
(17423−1250)+(90000−48999) = 28.29% (6.13)
allocdS =
(90000−48999)
(17423−1250)+(90000−48999) = 71.71% (6.14)
Table 6.2 compares the allocations from MPEC and BP method for different participating
players. It can be seen that unlike Table 6.1, allocation when players are only generators or
demand suppliers are different for the two methods given the new linear cost coefﬁcient for
generator at Syldavia. Speciﬁcally, generator at Syldavia and demand supplier at Borduria
will also contribute to cost recovery for MPEC method. This is because the high LMP differ-
ential makes the congestion revenue obtained from network investment more signiﬁcant than
the adverse effect on their energy proﬁt and payment respectively. Under this circumstance,
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beneﬁciaries-pay method ends up with the different allocation as it does not recognise the
beneﬁt from the congestion.
6.3 Conclusions
There has been a persistent concern regarding the deregulation, especially in transmission
investment aspect as it requires huge changes in legislation. Hence, we provide a intermediate
step in this chapter that employs the transmission capacity from centralised optimisation and
allocates the resulted investment cost based on the percentage from decentralised solutions.
To address above objective, we ﬁrstly derived the assumptions in Section 6.1 for making
transmission expansion planning under centralised and decentralised manners equal. In
details, number of participating players have to be large enough; otherwise players cannot
resist exerting market power to increase their proﬁts beyond the competitive levels. Secondly,
the existence of ﬁx cost will not change the value of optimal transmission capacity under
centralised market clearing process. Given decentralised methods, however, players would
decide the optimal capacity to build when taking the portion of the ﬁxed cost that they belong
into account. As a consequence, ﬁx invest cost cannot be included in the individual objective
function.
Based on the two assumptions stated in Section 6.1, sum of decentralised capacity from
our proposing MPEC method will approach the centralised results. Hence, the correspond-
ing allocation is compared with the most prevailing beneﬁciaries-pay method in different
situations. And it revealed in Section 6.2 that under some circumstances, the latter does not
capture the whole beneﬁt for the participating players, in contrast to the former.
In summary, cost allocation has always been a conundrum to deal with in the ﬁeld of
transmission investment, which is one of the reason at the very beginning that we commit to
develop methods for decentralised deciding the transmission capacities. And the currently
prevailing way for allocating cost is to let the beneﬁciaries pay the portion of investment
cost according to their corresponding incremental beneﬁt resulted from the new transmission
capacity. We agreed with the concept, and we demonstrated in this chapter that by using our
proposing decentralised method, we could not only carry out the centralised transmission
capacity, but also recognise some implicit advantages that players were supposed to receive.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Work summary
As mentioned at the beginning, there are two approaches for transmission network plan-
ning [28, 31, 52, 57]. The ﬁrst approach is to centrally decide the optimal investment plan by
a regulated transmission company. The corresponding investment cost then has to be allo-
cated to different system users based on some sensible principles. But the papers with repect
to cost allocation seem not able to accurately and fairly distribute the resulted investment
cost. For the second approach, transmission planning is based on decentralised, proﬁt-driven
proposals of self-interested players. Hence the investment cost can be perfectly recovered
as players are requested to pay the portion according to their own decisions. Moreover, this
decentralised paradigm is deemed as a further step towards the liberalisation of the elec-
tricity industry [20]. Therefore, we concentrated on put forward methods for decentralised
transmission investment in this thesis.
Several methods are proposed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Section 3.1 and 3.2 ﬁrst
solve the transmission investment problem in a 2-bus system in decentralised way. And both
methods employ some assumptions that may hold in the 2-bus system. For example, LMP
for each bus is assumed as the marginal cost of local generator and power ﬂowing from the
cheap to the expensive bus is the sum of the individual investment capacity. The results
obtained from both methods are the same: the cheap generator procures some capacity for
the sake of incremental proﬁt in energy and investment perspective, while on the contrary
the expensive generator does not show any interest in investing as its loss in energy aspect
would be more signiﬁcant than the earnings from investment. And what differs between
these two methods is that method in Section 3.1 constructs Lagrangian function for each of
the generator by adding relevant constraints with corresponding multipliers. KKT conditions
will then be obtained and solved analytically. But generally speaking the analytical way is
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not capable of dealing with complex cases, hence this method cannot be extensively used in
transmission investment problems. As for the method in Section 3.2, it uses iterative manner
to simultaneously maximise each generator’s proﬁt while assuming others’ actions are given.
Results attained, if converged, are guaranteed to be Nash equilibrium.
Although above two methods removed some of the assumptions used in [52] and [26],
the problem they solved is still simpliﬁed as stated. Therefore, we concentrate on designing
the decentralised methods that could get rid of all the unrealistic assumptions in the later
sections. Among which, method in Section 3.3 assigns a discrete set for each of the generator
and when ﬁxing competitors’ choices, each generator will try every action from the set and
let system operator clears the market based on competitors and its chosen action to obtain
the corresponding power schedules, ﬂows and LMPs for calculating the proﬁt this chosen
action brings. Then the action that produces the maximum total proﬁt will be identiﬁed, and
the aforementioned process iteratively continues until reaching converging results. Obtained
decentralised results are different according to three different granularities. Although it is
known that the smaller the granularity of the action set is, the more accuracy the obtained
investment capacities will be; the choice of granularity is still comprised due to the extremely
long computation time resulting from exhaustive search among all actions. But generally
speaking, the cheap generator is more inclined to invest in network for favoring both energy
proﬁt by producing more to serve other loads and investment beneﬁt by collecting congestion
surplus. The expensive generator, however, would rather not invest to keep its monopolistic
status.
Similar to method in Section 3.3, Section 3.4 also distributes a discrete action set for each
of the generator to choose its investment capacities. Nevertheless it applies Q-learning to
probabilistically pick the action at each iteration instead of experimenting every single one
within the set. Every action will be evaluated and the probability of selecting it depends on
its Q-value that calculated according to the reward this action receives at current iteration
and its accumulative performance. Hence, the method using Q-learning takes much shorter
computation time than it in Section 3.3. Nevertheless we still use the same granularity as
Section 3.3 did, and similar results are obtained as previous section. Speciﬁcally, cheap
generator eagers to invest while the expensive generator prefers not to contribute. It is worth
noting that with respect to the method in this section, it could guarantee to acquire converging
results. Whereas results obtained will not be Nash equilibrium and cannot be replicated due
to the pattern of probabilistic choosing actions.
As stated, both aforementioned methods regard individual investment capacities as dis-
crete parameters, hence they are not solved via optimisation. As a result, we proposed
another method in Section 3.5 for treating each generator’s investment capacities as contin-
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uous decision variables. At the beginning, the system is cleared centrally when assuming
transmission capacities are given. Then based on the obtained power outputs and nodal
prices, each generator gains the new capacities to invest by maximising its proﬁt. Therefore,
this method is constructed hierarchically and proceeded iteratively until reaching agreements
on all variables. Nevertheless, the decentralised capacity this method obtains looked different
from those in previous two sections. This is because this method solves power schedules
and LMPs in the ﬁrst level market clearing optimisation, which would consequently make
them as parameters rather than variables in the second level of proﬁt maximisation. Thus the
converged investment capacities are resulted from the investment proﬁt only. Hence, even the
expensive generator is motivated to invest in this section as the congestion surplus becomes
the only source of income when maximising individual proﬁt. The disadvantage of this
method is the incapability of modelling the interdependent LMP and individual investment
capacities concurrently.
We assumed there is no interconnections existing yet for all the case studies implemented
in Chapter 3 and generators therefore would invest from 0MW to create the transmission
network. Outcomes we are expecting for each of the proposed methods are ﬁnding the
Nash equilibrium as they are the pivotal index in decentralised optimisation to indicate the
agreement among players’ decisions. Methods in Section 3.1 and 3.2 used a 2-bus system as
it possesses some features that could simplify the problem. While the rest of the methods
in this chapter are implemented on a 3-bus mesh system, in which assumptions employed
before are no longer holding. Respective results are compared among these methods and also
with the centralised transmission planning in Section 3.6, which turn out that these proposing
methods behave well in terms of social efﬁciency.
For the method in Section 3.1, it gathers all the KKTs from each generator’s proﬁt
maximisation problem and solves individual investment capacities out simultaneously. How-
ever, results cannot deem as Nash equilibrium unless they are veriﬁed with iterative method.
While for the remaining methods except for the one using Q-learning, they all apply iterative
pattern to solve multiple optimisation problems and have the chance of not converging. The
possibility of non-convergence encourages us to attempt to prove the existence of Nash in
advance so that we would not waste time on searching for equilibrium in a system that does
not have any existed. Therefore Section 3.7.1 proves the Nash existence for the method
in Section 3.2 on the 2-bus system. As for the method in Section 3.5, its proof on Nash
existence will be much more difﬁcult because it does not assume ﬂow equals to the sum of
individual capacities. As a result, individual congestion surplus has to be formulated as an
inverse function, which complicates the problem and proof to a great extent. The detailed
procedure for Nash existence proof using the latter method is given in Section 3.7.2. But it
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is noted that we are still unable to guarantee to ﬁnd the Nash even their existence has been
conﬁrmed. With regard to the method introduced in Section 3.3 that uses discrete action set,
the existence of Nash cannot be proved due to the discontinuity of the investment capacities.
Although several methods have already been revealed in Chapter 3, they have respective
disadvantages. There is no methods in Chapter 3 yet that capture the mutual effect that LMPs
and transmission investment capacities have at the same time while not using assumptions
employed in Section 3.1 and 3.2. Hence, we continue to explore methods for solving decen-
tralised transmission investment problems in Chapter 4. As is known [31], LMPs are related
to the binding power balance and ﬂow constraints that are decided by centralised market
clearing process. Therefore, we include the KKT conditions derived from central market
clearing under each player’s optimisation problem as extra constraints. In doing so, LMPs are
still variables and conditions they have to comply with are the KKTs. Structure formed above
is called MPEC since one optimisation problem involves equilibrium constraints resulted
from another optimisation problem. This new method is introduced in Section 4.1 and for
multiple MPEC, they will be solved simultaneously given competitors’ actions and Nash is
expected after a number of iterations. But as discussed previously, using iterative manner to
solve multiple optimisations may not always end up with converging results. Therefore, we
proved the existence of Nash given this new game on the 2-bus system in Section 4.3. As for
large system, the proof will not be as easy but the basic principles are summarised in this
section.
Method in Section 4.2 obtains KKTs respectively from each player’s MPEC problem
that to be solved once to obtain every player’s investment capacities at the same time.
The new structure constructed is called EPEC. Given both MPEC and EPEC methods, no
simpliﬁcations are adopted and individual player could concurrently consider the effect of its
investment capacities on LMPs and ensure its proposals on transmission lines are still the
optimal choices after the proposed capacities are carried out. Therefore, these two methods
are regarded as the most advanced and general ones among all the proposed methods in this
thesis for decentralised transmission investment. But because of the inverse function used
to allocate congestion surplus and the energy revenue term that obtained by LMPs times
power outputs, MPEC problem exhibits the non-convex feature. Consequently, differentiating
MPEC will produce a much more complicated structure for EPEC. Besides it will deﬁnitely
be more difﬁcult to ﬁnd the solutions among large number of nonlinear KKTs, let alone
ﬁnding the one that happen to be the Nash equilibrium. As a result, we suppose MPEC
method is better than EPEC due to the easiness of programing and solving.
Case studies based on methods in Chapter 4 are displayed in Chapter 5, where Section 5.1
to Section 5.4 evaluate how individual investment capacities vary on the 2-bus system with
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different cost coefﬁcients of generators, different linear investment cost and different number
of identical participants through plenty of implementations. In these sensitivity analysis, no
transmission lines are assumed existing when making decentralised transmission decisions.
Moreover, not only generators could invest in the network; demand suppliers, and merchant
entities are also participating either by their own or compete with each other. It can be
seen from the results that increasing cost coefﬁcient for expensive generator would further
inspire investment desire. This is because price difference between two buses is enlarging
such that more money could be collected from congestion surplus. While for the increasing
investment cost, it will weaken participants’ interest in transmission investment due to the
higher construction cost for building the transmission lines. In addition, we classify all the
players into three levels according to their motivation in invest:
high motive : cheap generator, demand supplier at the expensive bus
medium motive : merchant entities
low motive : expensive generator, demand supplier at the cheap bus
Therefore, the cheap generator and demand supplier at the expensive bus will procure more
capacity in network planning. For the participants at the lower ranking, however, the situation
will be complex and we have no knowledge to foresee their choices. But generally the entities
in higher ranking will not invest less than those in lower ranks. Another very important
discovery from 2-bus case studies is that decentralised transmission planning will eventually
reach the centralised solutions once number of participating players is large enough. The
reason is deduced that with the increasing players, the effect of its transmission investment
capacity on LMP becomes negligible, which makes the market competitive and decentralised
and centralised transmission planning capacity equal.
Apart from the 2-bus small system, the more realistic scenarios are also assessed in Sec-
tion 5.5 for allowing individual player investing in the 16-bus UK system. Cases with/without
original transmission lines are investigated. Given the initial existence capacity in trans-
mission lines, beneﬁt margin left is largely reduced. Therefore, players invest much less
comparing to no lines existed no matter what participating players involve. Furthermore, the
effect of ﬁx investment cost causes to the individual capacities is also taken into account.
But comparing to yearly operating cost/yearly energy payment, the ﬁx investment cost is
too small to affect the individual decisions. As a result, decentralised investment capacities
with/without ﬁx cost look similar according to case studies in Section 5.5. Furthermore, we
rank participants according to their motivation in investment previously; however, it is likely
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for the 16-bus system that companies could be at different ranks of motivation on different
lines based on the geographic locations for the generating units and the demands.
It is known that we used a 3-bus system to implement methods proposed in Chapter 3.
For the methods presented in Chapter 4, however, the same 3-bus system is not applied
because given the parameters the 3-bus system used in Chapter 3, we have no luck to ﬁnd the
Nash equilibrium after trying various starting points. Hence it is deduced that Nash may not
exist for this system with the new game. Therefore, only the 2-bus and 16-bus system are
employed for implementation. This is also the inevitable limit for decentralised optimisation.
Finally, an intermediate step towards the fully decentralised structure is proposed in
Chapter 6 given innumerable difﬁculties for reaching ultimate deregulation. We ﬁrstly derive
the conditions that make centralised and decentralised results equal, which are ignoring
ﬁx investment cost and having enough number of participating players. Given which, the
transmission investment capacity could be obtained via centralised way as usual, but the
consequent investment cost is allocated based on decentralised solutions. In doing so, the
transmission network is expanded with the most social efﬁcient capacity; and meanwhile the
investment cost is completely recovered based on the percentage that all players are happy
with. We then compare the allocations obtained from the proposing decentralised MPEC
method with the beneﬁciaries-pay method and ﬁnd out under particular circumstances, the
latter may not be able to capture some implicit beneﬁts belonging to the players. Hence, the
proposed intermediate step seems viable such that it not only overcomes the difﬁculties of
realising fully decentralised market structure, but also resolves the cost allocation challenge.
7.2 Possible extensions on future works
Based on proposed decentralised transmission investment model, several extensions could be
carried on to enrich the work.
The ﬁrst idea is to assume generators are strategic, which means they will no longer bid
with their real cost functions. Then the cases for strategic generators with/without making
transmission investment decisions could be modelled and it is very likely from our judgment
that by allowing strategic generators to invest in the network, they will cheat less on their cost
coefﬁcients since energy revenue would not be the only source of the income. If they increase
the price by cheating on cost functions, the associated congestion surplus may reduce. Hence
it seems a reasonable way to mitigate market power that generators perform by making
themselves lose interest in cheating.
Furthermore, generation capacity expansion planning could be included so that the effect
the introduction of generation investment causes to the transmission investment is evaluated.
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It seems spontaneous to involve generation capacity expansion planning into proposed
transmission investment model, however, the difﬁculties of proceeding this extension depends
on how realistic we would like to model the generation investment behaviours. And three
choices that represent different levels of modelling difﬁculties are given as below:
1. The easiest level is to let generators expand on the existing capacities. By doing so,
they just need to decide how much extra MW to build on the existing units, and the
associated new capacity’s characteristics such as cost coefﬁcients and location are all
known;
2. The second level is not to expand on the existing capacities. Hence generators can
choose the site for its investment, but the type of new generating units are pre-assigned.
In other words, the cost coefﬁcients of candidate units are known;
3. The most difﬁcult level is to let generators free decide where to invest and what kind of
units to invest. Under this circumstance, the cost coefﬁcients of new units are unclear
and large number of new variables have to be introduced.
Consequently, if choosing generation investment as the future work, it is important to decide
how much freedom we wish to give to the generators. And the more freedom generators
have, more difﬁcult the modelling will be.
Finally, considering currently the demands are assumed as unchanged with the price
volatility, they could be ﬂexible in the further work. And we may also let the ﬂexible demand
suppliers invest in transmission network. As a consequence, the centralised market clearing
process is to maximise the social welfare. Therefore, for the MPEC and EPEC methods,
KKT conditions from new centralised optimisation shall be obtained and the consequent
objective function for ﬂexible demand supplier is to maximise the net beneﬁt from serving
the loads plus the proﬁt from transmission investment.
After taking all the possible extensions into account, the systemwill be modelled relatively
comprehensive and mature because it not only includes generators with complex proﬁles and
demand suppliers with response to the varying price, but also involves long-term generation
and transmission expansion. Under the circumstance, a policy mechanism could be created to
evaluate the effects of some policies that the government plans to put forward and to provide
an insight of what may cause due to those policies to the electricity market. Especially in
2009, UK government issued Electricity Market Reform, policies and market conditions are
both possible to change massively so that it is crucial of using a proper model to assess the
116 Conclusions
inﬂuences of those changes to the whole system in advance to avoid unexpected losses and
making wrong decisions.
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Appendix A
Jacobian and Hessian matrix
We are going to provide analytical expression of Jacobian and Hessian matrices of following
nonlinear equations:
f (x) :=W [(Ax)◦ (Bx)] , (A.1)
where x ∈ℜn; A,B ∈ℜm×n;W ∈ℜp×m; ◦ denotes the Schur/Hadamard product (element-
wise multiplication).
g(x) :=W [(Ax) (Dx+L)] , (A.2)
where D ∈ℜm×n; L ∈ℜm;  denotes the Schur/Hadamard division (element-wise division).
h(x) :=W [(Ax)◦ (Bx) (Dx+L)] , (A.3)
and
j(x) :=W {(Ax)◦ (Bx)◦ (Cx) [(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]} . (A.4)
A.1 Jacobian Matrix of Nonlinear Functions
The analytical expression of Jacobian matrix of aforementioned nonlinear equations are
given as below.
J( f (x)) =W [diag(Ax)B+diag(Bx)A] , (A.5)
J(g(x)) =W
{
diag [1 (Dx+L)]A−
diag{(Ax) [(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]}D}, (A.6)
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J(h(x)) =W
{
diag [(Bx) (Dx+L)]A+
diag [(Ax) (Dx+L)]B−
diag{(Ax)◦ (Bx) [(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]}D},
(A.7)
J( j(x)) =
W{diag{(Bx)◦ (Cx) [(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]}A+
diag{(Ax)◦ (Cx) [(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]}B+
diag{(Ax)◦ (Bx) [(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]}C−
2×diag{(Ax)◦ (Bx)◦ (Cx)
[(Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)◦ (Dx+L)]}D},
(A.8)
A.2 Hessian Matrix of Nonlinear Functions
We are going to provide analytical expression of Hessian matrix of following nonlinear
equations
H ( f (x)) =
p
∑
r=1
m
∑
l=1
(
Al Bl +B

l Al
)
W{r,l}, (A.9)
where Al denotes the lth row of matrix A; Er,l denotes element of matrix E at the rth row
and lth column.
H (g(x)) =
p
∑
r=1
m
∑
l=1
(
−D

l Al +A

l Dl
(Dlx+Ll)
2 +
(2Alx)Dl Dl
(Dlx+Ll)
3
)
W{r,l},
(A.10)
where Ll denotes the lth element of vector L.
H (h(x)) =
p
∑
r=1
m
∑
l=1
(
Al Bl +B

l Al
(Dlx+Ll)
+
2(Alx)(Blx)Dl Dl
(Dlx+Ll)
3 −
(Blx)
(
Dl Al +A

l Dl
)
+(Alx)
(
Dl Bl +B

l Dl
)
(Dlx+Ll)
2
)
W{r,l},
(A.11)
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H (h(x)) =
p
∑
r=1
m
∑
l=1
(
(Clx)
(
Al Bl +B

l Al
)
(Dlx+Ll)
2 +
(Blx)
(
Al Cl +C

l Al
)
+(Alx)
(
Bl Cl +C

l Bl
)
(Dlx+Ll)
2 −
2× (Blx)(Clx)
(
Dl Al +A

l Dl
)
(Dlx+Ll)
3 +
2× (Alx)(Clx)
(
Dl Bl +B

l Dl
)
(Dlx+Ll)
3 +
2× (Alx)(Blx)
(
Dl Cl +C

l Dl
)
(Dlx+Ll)
3 +
3× 2× (Alx)(Blx)(Clx)D

l Dl
(Dlx+Ll)
4
)
W{r,l},
(A.12)

Appendix B
GSF for 16-bus system
Given the reactances as 1Ω for all the branches in the 16-bus system, the corresponding GSF
is given below.
GSF=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

